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ABSTRACT 
Is there a significant generational difference among South Koreans? If so, how do 
South Korean generations differ in their perceptions regarding national security? This 
thesis examines how historical experiences generate a cohort effect on certain age groups 
in South Korea (Republic of Korea [ROK]), and how these specific cohort effects 
develop generational differences. Four generations that have unique tendencies and 
characteristics are identified through cohort experience analysis. The New Generation, 
those in their 20s and 30s in South Korean society, has anti-North Korean, pro-American, 
pro-autonomy tendencies. The Democratic Generation, those in their 40s, has pro-North 
Korean, anti-American, pro-autonomy tendencies. The Transition/386 Generation, those 
in their 50s, has pro-North Korean, anti-American, anti-autonomy tendencies. Lastly, the 
War Generation, those in their 60s and older, has anti-North Korean, pro-American, anti-
autonomy tendencies. These four generations are then tested using available public-
opinion poll data to confirm their expected perceptions on numerous issues regarding 1) 
North Korea, 2) the United States, and 3) ROK national autonomy—independent from 
the U.S. influence. The public opinion poll data largely confirm the expected outcome, 
concluding that the generational characteristics and differences in South Korea could 
influence the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
South Korea, also known as the Republic of Korea (ROK), is a rich and vibrant 
democratic country, and it remains a strong ally of the United States in Northeast Asia. The 
ROK is an exemplary case of the developmental state, as the country has shown both rapid 
economic development and relatively peaceful democratization through free-liberal 
values.1 However, as a result of its compressed modernity and its unique situation among 
its neighboring peer-nations, numerous divided social groups have formed within its 
society. These divided social groups have different political views, perspectives on North 
Korea and Korean reunification, priorities in their lives, social values, and perceptions of 
the United States and the U.S.-ROK relationship.  
Social divisions in South Korea can be categorized according to several different 
factors, such as regional background, political identity, and generational differences. In 
South Korea, these three categorizing factors are both influential and dominant, such that 
knowing about these factors can generate a reasonably accurate stereotype about a person, 
especially on national security matters. Some argue that among these factors, generational 
differences have the most significant effect on U.S.-ROK security relations and the U.S.-
ROK alliance.2 However, others argue that generational characteristics do not have a 
significant influence on South Korean security policy and the U.S.-ROK alliance, but only 
on social and cultural issues.  
This thesis will research the significance of South Korean generational effects on 
the ROK’s national security and on the U.S.-ROK alliance, focusing on three outcomes: 1) 
perceptions of North Korea, 2) perceptions of the United States and U.S. forces in Korea, 
 
1 Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: Ecco, 2013), 20. 
2 Rachel Schultz, “Experts: S. Korea’s ‘386 Generation’ Favors Kim Regime over U.S.,” 
Homeland411, August 8, 2018, https://homeland411.com/experts-s-koreas-386-generation-favors-kim-
regime-over-u-s/. 
2 
and 3) perceptions of ROK national autonomy, in the sense of autonomy from U.S. 
influence.  
The research will first analyze the fundamental question: Is there a significant 
difference and distinction among South Korean generations? If so, how do South Korean 
generations differ in their perceptions regarding national security? By identifying 
generational characteristics and trends on security matters, this research will next answer a 
final question: what impact do generational differences in the South Korean population 
have on the U.S.-ROK alliance?  
Based on attitudes on these issues, generations may be categorized as more 
politically left or more right: for example, a generation with stronger pro-North Korea, 
anti-American, and pro-autonomy attitudes can be described as more left-progressive, and 
a generation with anti-North Korea, pro-American, and pro-dependence attitudes can be 
described as more right-conservative. However, this thesis will not use the blanket 
description of left and right alone to describe generational effects. It will also assess 
attitudes on issues separately to see whether members of a generation always hold the same 
combination of attitudes or whether, instead, the generational attitude patterns differ across 
different particular issues. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
South Korea is a relatively young democracy with a largely segmented and mixed 
demography. It is a society in which an older generation that remembers the Japanese 
colonial period and a younger generation that does not even remember the authoritarian 
military regime live together. In other words, the generation that originated the U.S.-ROK 
alliance and the generation that currently sustains the alliance have different motives and 
attitudes toward the alliance and toward national security. Meanwhile, the 386 Generation, 
who fought against the authoritarian regime and for the democratization of South Korea in 





moment. As Lankov points out, South Koreans in their 50s, the 386 Generation, continue 
to hold progressive perspectives toward North Korea and the U.S.-ROK alliance.3 Notably, 
this particular generation shows an unusual departure from the expected aging effect, in 
which older generations tend to be (or become) more conservative than younger ones; and 
this raises the question of whether an extra cohort effect helps this generation resist the 
anticipated aging effect. Similarly, the youngest political generation in South Korea, 
widely known as the Give-up generation, has emerged as a significant political actor since 
the candlelight vigil surrounding Park Geun-hye’s impeachment in 2017 and the election 
that year of current President Moon Jae-in.4 Many speculate as to whether this youngest 
political generation will have as clear a stamp of generational politics as its predecessors. 
As such, assessing South Korean generational differences can provide an explanation of 
left/right conflict on the issues of national security and insights about generational behavior. 
Since the U.S.-ROK alliance was first established in 1953 as a bulwark against a 
communist North Korea, it has expanded to comprehensive cooperation and partnership in 
many different global aspects, including trade, security, climate, and development. The 
role of the United States has largely stayed the same in the alliance, but the ROK’s role has 
been radically changed in the last half-century with the rapid development of its economy 
and the achievement of modern democracy. In South Korea, with its liberal democracy, 
public perception and opinion play a significant role. Answering the research question 
about generational differences in South Korea could help us better understand social 
attitudes in Korean society and their likely trajectory in the future, toward the end of forging 
better U.S.-ROK relations. 
3 Andrei Lankov, “Understanding S. Korea’s ‘386 generation’ and pro-north activists,” The Asian, 
September 17, 2013, http://www.theasian.asia/archives/83188. 
4 Steven Denney, “South Koreans Can’t Agree What Democracy Is,” Foreign Policy, March 13, 2017, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/13/south-koreans-cant-agree-what-democracy-is/. 
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1. Changed Situations and Generational Gap 
The world situation has radically changed since the alliance was first established in 
1953, and there is a significant gap in perceptions, values, and priorities between the 
generation that initiated the U.S.-ROK alliance and current generations that may want to 
reestablish the objectives and responsibilities of the alliance.  
Three major changes have impacted the traditional U.S.-ROK alliance. First, South 
Korea achieved its “miracle of the Han river:” rapid industrialization and economic 
development. After the Korean War, South Korea was “the poorer half of one of the poorest 
countries in the world.”5 It was an underdeveloped, rural, and less-democratic society. 
Now, South Korea is part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and G20, with one of the most influential economies in the world and a high level 
of democratization.6 With its improved capacity and democratization, South Korea may 
seek more autonomy and self-interested diplomacy outside of U.S. influence. This self-
interest creates friction and tension in the U.S.-ROK relations, as highlighted in the 2006 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations and recent defense cost-sharing negotiations.7  
Second, the Cold War ended, and the Soviet Union collapsed along with the spectre 
of communism. Through this victory, the United States and its allies enjoyed Pax 
Americana, a unipolar world-order in which U.S. values of a free-liberal economy and 
democracy presided over the globe. However, this meant the greatest common security 
threat of the alliance no longer existed, threatening loss of the alliance’s purpose and 
meaning—especially when the young generations of South Korea did not understand the 
ideological battle against communism in the Cold War era and instead saw communist and 
former-communist nations as global economic partners. 
 
 
5 Michael Seth, A Concise History of Modern Korea: From the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present 
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 167. 
6 Michael Seth, A Concise History of Modern Korea, 167. 
7 Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, The Evolution of the South Korea-United States Alliance (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 244–253. 
5 
Third, new threats to the alliance emerged. North Korea, or the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), enjoyed relatively better conditions than South Korea 
until the 1970s. However, it started to suffer in overall capacity relative to South Korea, 
especially upon the Soviet Union’s decline and the ROK’s rapid development in the 1980s. 
This created a perceptional discrepancy between older and younger South Korean 
generations, since one remembers North Korea as a real existential threat while the latter 
no longer thinks of North Korea as a real threat. Also, the DPRK started to rapidly increase 
its nuclear weapons capability since the 1990s. Despite a series of nonproliferation efforts, 
the DPRK announced in 2017 that it now possesses strategic nuclear armaments and 
intercontinental delivery methods that can reach the continental United States. 8  The 
original intent of the U.S.-ROK alliance was to focus on deterring North Korea from hostile 
actions against the South; but now, with a direct nuclear threat to the U.S. mainland, the 
importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance has increased even further for its ability to let the 
United States monitor North Korea from its close proximity. Also, the rise of China 
provides a new challenge to the 65-year-old U.S.-ROK alliance. China’s ambition to 
become a regional and global power exerts pressure on the South Korean economy and its 
politics, which also drives uncomfortable tension between the United States and South 
Korea, as exemplified by recent increase South Korean hedging largely influenced by a 
left-leaning political generation—the 386 Generation.  
2. Generation in Power: Progressive 386 Generation 
The 386 Generation is the core group that started and organized the anti-American 
movement of the 1990s through the 2000s. Its members rose to significant political power 
as they drove the triumph of Roh Moo-hyun in the 2002 presidential election. After that, 
the 386 Generation began to take major roles in political office, including the President’s 
cabinet. For example, current President Moon’s first Blue House staff included 41 out of 
60 members from the 386 Generation.9 Along with its willingness to work with North 
 
8 Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, The Evolution of the South Korea-United States, 144. 
9 Gye-man Kang and Soo-hyun Oh, “Members of President Moon’s 1st Blue House Staffs,” Ray The P 
(MK News), October 11, 2017, http://raythep.mk.co.kr/newsView.php?cc=&no=14910. 
6 
Korea, the 386 Generation is thought to have left-leaning and autonomy-seeking tendencies 
(in the sense of autonomy from the United States). This attitude has created a foreign policy 
divergent from the traditional U.S.-ROK alignment—a departure from the approach of 
older generations.  
Over the last sixty-five years of the U.S.-ROK alliance, there has been increasing 
pushback by an autonomy-seeking South Korean population against the ROK’s heavy 
reliance on the U.S.-ROK military cooperation. Anti-American sentiment gradually grew 
among South Koreans as they struggled for democratization against their authoritarian 
military government in the 1980s. South Koreans were unhappy that the United States 
remained silent on humanitarian violence issues regarding the ROK’s non-democratic 
regime, justified by an ideological fight against communism.10 Anti-American sentiment 
peaked in 2002 after a U.S. Army truck accidentally struck and killed two schoolgirls, and 
the soldiers involved were released with no charge. This incident triggered widespread 
South Korean public resentment regarding what was perceived as the unfair terms of the 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and its customary extraterritoriality for U.S. troops.11  
Growing up amid such anti-American rhetoric, young South Koreans, including both the 
386 Generation and post-386 generations, started to question the necessity and purpose of 
the U.S.-ROK alliance—an alliance that for older generations was fixed as a component of 
national identity and rarely questioned.  
This generational division between a more pro-American older age group and a 
more anti-American (or, more precisely, pro-autonomy) younger age group suggests 
another significant question: Is there a cohort effect that might negatively impact the U.S.-




10 Kang-Ro Lee, “The Analysis of the Developmental Process of Anti-Americanism in South Korea,” 
Korean Journal of International Studies 44, no.4 (December 2004). 250–251. 
11 Yonhap, “Korea-US SOFA compared to Japan and Germany.” Hankyoreh, December 10, 2002, 
http://legacy.www.hani.co.kr/section-003000000/2002/12/003000000200212101735037.html.  
7 
States consider this effect among the 386 generation and post-386 generation when 
constructing the South Korea policy? 
3. The Give-up Generation: Receding from 386 Generation 
“Give-up Generation” is new terminology referring to younger South Koreans—
those in their 20s and 30s. The term “give-up” refers to the social phenomenon of young 
people’s hopelessness due to high unemployment rates and social inequality in South 
Korean society. This generation was born into an already-wealthy South Korea and has 
only known South Korea as such. As a result, this generation might hold higher standards—
and, in turn, stronger disappointment. By its high standards, this generation never has seen 
a strong economy. The Give-up Generation’s members, in general, feel that “they have 
been abandoned by their government and corporations.”12 In concept, they are similar to 
Japan’s satori sedai (variously translated as both the “enlightened” and “resigned” 
generation). On issues of national security, the Give-up Generation is thought to have a 
more anti-North Korean perspective, and not as strong ethnic-nationalist and anti-
American attitudes—the opposite of the 386 Generation.  
However, as highlighted through the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) crisis in 2016 and the Boycott Japan movement in 2019, South Korean society 
has become more polarized through nationalism. Park describes this new social 
phenomenon as conservatization rooted in practical nationalism, as distinct from the older 
generation’s resistance nationalism rooted in anti-Japan sentiment or anti-imperialism with 
a catch-up mentality.13 South Korean attitudes towards Japan provide a good metric to 
measure the effect of nationalism within generational differences, as South Korean 
nationalism stemmed from the anti-Japanese movement during the Japanese colonial 
period (1910-1945). The older generation, which directly remembers the influence of Japan 
 
 
12 Hyung-a Kim, “The seven-Give-up Generation,” PolicyForum, August 26, 2015, 
http://www.policyforum.net/the-seven-give-up-generation/. 
13 Sun-Young Park, “Shinsedae: Conservative Attitudes of a ‘New Generation’ in South Korea and 
the Impact on the Korean Presidential Election,” EWC Insights 2:1 (September 2007), 2. 
8 
as a colonizer and oppressive invader, has an extremely hostile and competitive attitude 
towards Japan, but this resistant nationalism against Japan faded as the generations 
progressed. Unlike this resistance nationalism, the new practical nationalism is based on 
confidence and national pride, with the belief that Korea is no longer inferior to other big-
power nations.14 The new generation in South Korea seems to be the driving force behind 
this new form of nationalism, in which accepting foreign culture is not inconsistent with 
openly condemning foreign governments actions (as illustrated, for example, by drinking 
Starbucks and eating McDonald’s after participating in a candlelight protest against the 
United States). 15 With this practical nationalism, the young South Korean generation 
seems to have transitioned away from historical, ideological, and cultural antagonism. As 
shown in Table 1, younger South Koreans in their 20s seem to have weaker animosity 
towards Japan as a nation, compared to other age groups. Also, the same table shows that 











14 Sun-Young Park, “Shinsedae,” 2. 
15 Sun-Young Park, “Shinsedae,” 2. 
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Table 1. Public Opinion Poll Data: South Korean Perception of Japan and 
Japanese People (July 2019)16 
  Perception of Japan Perception of Japanese people 
   N Like Dislike No answer N Like Dislike No answer 
Total 1000 12% 77% 10% 1000 41% 43% 17% 
Region Seoul 194 16% 76% 9% 194 43% 39% 18% 
Gyeong-gi 305 13% 77% 10% 305 41% 41% 18% 
Gangwon 30 - - - 30 - - - 
Chung-cheong 105 8% 79% 13% 105 38% 43% 19% 
Jeolla 99 5% 84% 11% 99 35% 45% 20% 
Gyeong-buk 100 16% 78% 6% 100 39% 51% 10% 
Gyeong-nam 154 14% 76% 11% 154 44% 43% 13% 
Jeju 13 - - - 13 - - - 
Age-
group   
19-29 173 15% 69% 16% 173 51% 29% 19% 
30s 168 10% 78% 13% 168 40% 43% 17% 
40s 197 14% 80% 6% 197 41% 44% 15% 
50s 200 9% 82% 10% 200 43% 41% 15% 
60s and older 261 13% 78% 9% 261 32% 51% 18% 
Political 
Identity 
Conservative 239 16% 75% 9% 239 41% 43% 15% 
Center-middle 320 12% 79% 10% 320 44% 39% 17% 
Progressive 281 11% 83% 6% 281 45% 43% 12% 
None 160 10% 68% 22% 160 26% 49% 25% 
Note 1: Table reconstructed from Gallup Korea data, the original data shows age-group as 
decades (30s, 40s, etc). 
Note 2: The original data has not given statistics for sample size smaller than 50. 
 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, the definition of generation in sociological terms, along with related 
phenomena such as cohort effects and aging effects, will be first discussed. These ideas 
have been well developed both in general and regarding South Korea by scholars including 
Mannheim (1952), Inglehart (1997), and Park (2017). After establishing key terminology 
 
16 Adapted from Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20190712),” July 2019, 
https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1031. 
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and concepts, different classification methods of South Korean generations will be 
compared and contrasted. In the process of discussing the classification of generations, this 
research will review existing literature on what it means to be on the left or the right in 
South Korea—which differs from corresponding labels in the United States—at each 
historical epoch. 
1. Definition of Generation, Cohort, and Aging Effects 
In “The Problem of Generations,” Karl Mannheim, a Hungarian-German 
sociologist who first analyzed the social effects of generations, defines a socio-political 
generation using three concepts: generation status, generation as actuality, and generation 
units.17 According to Mannheim, a generation is formed by individuals who were born in 
a specific time period (status), in a shared social community with unique culture and 
consciousness (actuality), and who are then collectively mobilized as multiple cultural, 
social, and political action groups (units).18 In his writing, particularly in describing a 
generation as a birth group, he claims that a generation is a social location (status) like 
one’s social class: 
Belonging to the same generation or age group…endow [s] the individuals 
sharing in them with a common location in the social and historical process, 
and thereby limit [s] them to a specific range of potential experience, 
predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and 
experience, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action.19  
In general, the notion that aging beyond a young age helps encourage conservatism 
can be regarded as conventional wisdom. 20  Added social responsibilities and 
psychological resistance to change and uncertainty lead to conservatism as people get older. 
However, Mannheim opposes a traditional explanation that the younger generation is 
 
17 Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge (London: 
Routledge, 1952), 302. 
18 Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” 302–304. 
19 Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” 291. 
20 Norval Glenn, “Aging and Conservatism.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 415 (1974),176.  
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always more progressive while the older generation is always more conservative.21 While 
he agrees that the socio-political tendencies of an age group depend on their experiences 
in their youth (between the ages of seventeen and twenty-five), he believes this experience 
shapes a unique set of values that lasts a long period of time—even offsetting the aging 
effect of conservatism.22  
Also, Mannheim claims that since multiple polarities of ideological units coexist 
within a generation, not every age-location group creates “new collective impulses and 
formative principles original to itself;” and that on the occasions where it happens, the 
tempo of social change plays a decisive role.23 In the case of rapid social and cultural 
transformation, the latent and continuous natural adaptation from one generation to another 
is no longer possible, so that a clearly distinguishable new impulse is consolidated as a new 
generation style. 
The definition and characteristics of generation identified by Mannheim are 
confirmed by Inglehart’s theory of intergenerational value change. Inglehart explains the 
generation effect with two related hypotheses: a scarcity hypothesis and a socialization 
hypothesis. According to Inglehart’s scarcity hypothesis, an individual places priority on 
what he/she had in relatively short supply.24 This suggests that one’s values reflect the 
socioeconomic environment in which one is living. The socialization hypothesis “holds 
that one’s values reflect the conditions of one’s pre-adult years,” creating a substantial time 
lag between the socioeconomic environment and value priorities. 25 These hypotheses 
emerge from Maslow’s concept of a “need hierarchy,” which holds that human needs are 
ranked, and that lower needs must be fulfilled before one pursues higher needs.26 Inglehart 
regroups Maslow’s five hierarchical needs—physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-
 
21 Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” 297. 
22 Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” 300. 
23 Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” 309. 
24 Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political 
Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 33. 
25 Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, 33. 
26 Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, 33. 
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actualization (Figure 1)—into two value groups: materialist values (physiological and 
safety), and post-materialist values (love, esteem, and self-actualization). 
 
Figure 1. Maslow’s Need Hierarchy27 
In the 1990s, Inglehart argued, “as a result of the rapid economic development and 
the expansion of the welfare state that followed World War II, the formative experiences 
of the younger birth cohorts in most industrial societies differed from those of older cohorts 
in fundamental ways that were leading them to develop different value priorities.”28 From 
this argument, he concludes that materialistic society would phase out with global 
industrialization, and that new post-modern and post-material values were emerging.29 
Inglehart argues that with more economic stability and a sense of physical security, people 
tend to give higher priority to the quality of life, following Maslow.30  
Inglehart compares forty-three countries worldwide and finds a common 
generational formation among these countries. People in older generations, who 
 
27 Source: Saul Mcleod, “Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs,” Simply Psychology, May 21, 2018, 
https://www.simplypsychology.org/simplypsychology.org-Maslows-Hierarchy-of-Needs.pdf. 
28 Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, 4. 
29 Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, 324. 
30 Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, 33. 
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experienced poverty, war, and insecurity during their youth, develop materialistic values 
which emphasize economic growth, religious beliefs, and national security; and people in 
younger generations, who were born amid prosperity and stability, pursue post-
materialistic values such as political activism, social diversity, environmental protection, 
and quality of life.31  
However, Inglehart’s assessment was published in 1997, more than two decades 
ago. With a series of global economic crises in the 2000s, growing inequality, and the 
recent emergence of Great Power Competition, people in younger generations have 
experienced increased insecurity and may be drawn back toward materialistic values. This 
generational transition from an older materialistic generation to a post-materialistic 
generation up until the 1990s and then to a more recently-emerged and more materialistic 
younger generation can also be found in South Korean society.32 
Park Jae-heung, following Mannheim and Inglehart, formulates a definition of 
generations to assess South Korean society in particular. According to Park, a generation 
is: 
1. A group of people who were born at a similar time in a specific society 
and shared historical and cultural experiences. 
2. A group that has similar perspectives and action patterns over a long 
period of time. 
3. A group that has a “consciousness of kind” with other members in its 
birth cohort.33 
Park also claims that South Korean society is a good case study supporting 
Inglehart’s theory of intergenerational value change. The older generation, which had 
experienced the Japanese colonial period, Korean War, poverty, and social instability, 
should have distinctively different values from the younger generation, which had 
experienced rapid economic growth in a more stable mass-consumer society and did not 
experience the suffering of the older generation. Noteworthy here is that Inglehart’s 1995 
 
31 Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, 34–35. 
32 Sun-Young Park, “Shinsedae,” 2–3. 
33 Jae-Heung Park, “Generation Composition in the South Korean Society,” Literature and Society 18, 
no. 3 (August 2005), 175. 
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analysis showed that South Korea had the largest difference in generational values among 
the 44 countries for which he had gathered data.34 
The term “generation” is often used interchangeably with “birth cohort” or “cohort” 
by sociologists. A cohort is “a group of people who have shared some critical experience 
during the same interval of time,” recalling Mannheim and Inglehart “generation.”35 In 
turn, a cohort effect, as described by Alwin and McCammon, is “a distinctive formative 
experience which members of a birth cohort…share that lasts—and marks them—
throughout their lives.”36 Thus, this thesis uses the terms “birth cohort” and “cohort effect” 
as equivalent to “generation” and “generational effect.”  
2. Methodology for Classifying South Korean Generations 
Classifying populations into generations requires a high level of prudence since one 
cannot distinguish one generation from another simply by drawing lines to divide a timeline. 
People are constantly being born into the world, and their experience cannot be perfectly 
differentiated based on their birth year. 37  However, a generational study cannot be 
conducted without setting some breakpoints between the generations. Scholars dividing 
society into different generations have used a variety of methods. Table 2 consolidates 




34 Jae-Heung Park, “Intergenerational Change and Postmaterialism in Korea: Cohort Analysis,” 
Korean Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (August 2012), 72. 
35 Duane Alwin and Ryan McCammon, “Generations, Cohorts, and Social Change,” in Handbook of 
the Life Course, ed. Jeylan Mortimer and Michael Shanahan (Boston, MA: Springer U.S., 2003), 26. 
36 Duane Alwin and Ryan McCammon, “Generations, Cohorts, and Social Change,” 26. 
37 Jae-Heung Park, “Generation Composition in the South Korean Society,” 176. 
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Table 2. Labels and Key Characteristics of Generations in South Korea38 





Korean War gen, 4/19 gen, 
Yushin gen, IMF gen,  
W-gen, R-gen, City Hall-gen 
- Good representation of cohort 
perspective 
- Focus on experiences based 
on political, economic, cultural 
events and situations 
- Low market usability  Time Periods 
Industrial, Democratization, 
Post-Cold War,  
Baby-boomers, 386-gen,  
88-manwon generation 




2030-Gen (age group in their 
20s and 30s), 5060-Gen, 1020-
Gen 
- Dual representation of age/
cohort effects 
- Ideological tendencies 




1318 (mid-high school),  
1315 (middle school),  
1618 (high school),  
1924 (College) 
- Dual representation of age/
cohort effects 
- Different marketing 
objectives Life Stages 
Young Adults, College 






Shinsedae, X-gen, N-gen, 
Digital-gen, IP-gen, P-gen, 
Web2.0-gen, Silk-gen 
- More general expression for 
cultural/behavioral 
characteristics 




P-gen, WINE-gen,  
MOSAIC-gen, 2.0-Consumers 
- Based on sample researches 
- Different marketing 
objectives 
 
According to Park, there are three major methods of classifying different 
generations: by historical experience, age/life stages, or cultural/behavioral characteristics. 
Generational classification based on historical experience is the method most widely used 
in social science. As described by Mannheim and Inglehart, this method uses crucial group 
experiences in history as the marker to differentiate groups.39 This method is suitable for 
identifying cohort effects in social and political phenomena, including generational 
perspectives on national security.  
 
38 Adapted from Jae-Heung Park, Generational Difference and Conflict: Theory and Reality 
(세대차이와 갈등: 이론과 현실) (Jinju, Korea: Kyungsang University Press, 2017), 87. 
39 Jae-Heung Park, “Generation Composition in the South Korean Society,” 176. 
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The method of using age and life stages to classify the generation is often used to 
emphasize the aging effect, which looks for differences in sociopolitical maturity level.40 
Also, this classification method focuses on different generational traits at different 
chronological periods. For example, when the 2030-generation (age group in their 20s and 
30s) was referred to in 2000, this generation was characterized to focus on newly emerged 
lifestyles and different value priorities from the older generations. When the same 2030-
generation was referred to in 2002 during the FIFA World Cup and 16th presidential 
election, this generation was characterized as the key player for reform and as a hope for 
the future. In 2005, the same 2030-generation was characterized as a main target in the 
consumer market. As such, the method of using age and life stages as a classifying factor 
has a specific use in differentiating one group from others at a certain time period, but it is 
not suitable for the purposes of this thesis research since this research seeks to identify 
specific age-cohorts and their generational effects on national security issues.41  
The method of using cultural/behavioral characteristics is widely used in marketing 
research or media to emphasize spikes of cultural or behavioral effects of certain age groups. 
Shinsedae, literally a “new generation,” became a token word to characterize iconoclastic 
young adults in their early 20s in 1993. Discussing and understanding shinsedae was a 
social phenomenon in the 1990s and early 2000s, because this new generation seemed to 
display significant differences from older generations (including from the 386 Generation) 
and a sudden departure from the anticipated trajectory of societal progression. However, 
as the term shinsedae, quickly became widely consumed in media and marketing firms, it 
started to lose its original impact. As a result, new labeling was constantly invented to 
replace this “new generation,” such as X-generation, N-Generation, W (World Cup)-
generation, R (Red devil)-generation, P (Patriotic/Pragmatic)-generation, and City Hall 
(Candlelight)-generation.42 This method of classifying generation is also not suitable for 
the purposes of this thesis research since each of these different classification phrases of a 
 
40 Jae-Heung Park, Generational Difference and Conflict: Theory and Reality, 89. 
41 Jae-Heung Park, Generational Difference and Conflict: Theory and Reality, 90. 
42 Jae-Heung Park, Generational Difference and Conflict: Theory and Reality, 92. 
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new generation is simply an overused expression created by media and marketing firms, 
not distinguishing the actual generational differences. Thus, for the purpose of this research, 
a more comprehensive and accurate classification of generations—which also take an 
emphasis on their political/security characteristic—is needed. 
3. Classification of Generations in South Korea 
Many scholars, who attempted to classify the South Korean generations, have 
agreed that the historical experience method captures the most comprehensive generational 
effects in the South Korean society—especially on generational perspectives on the 
national security issues. Within the historical experience, there are two different categories 
of experience that scholars used to explain the cohort effects. One category is ideological/
political cohort experiences such as anti-communism and authoritarianism during the 
military regimes in South Korea. Another category is economic cohort experiences such as 
growth in the people’s income level, economic development, and economic crises. In 
summary, the generational classification study conducted by selected scholars (Park, Choi, 
Hong, and Denney) is consolidated in Figure 2. To provide historical context to these 
generational classifications, key events and government administration information is 
overlaid on generation blocks. 
18 
 
a Denney has taken the original classification from Dalton, Russell and Doh Chull Shin. “Growing up Democratic: Generational Change in East 
Asian Democracies.” Japanese Journal of Political Science 15, no. 3 (September 2014): 345–372. 
b Denney did not specify the birth years, but it was calculated from the referred age-group at the time of his proposal (Age 20–29 group at 2015). 
c Yi’s proposal for this thesis research. 
Figure 2. Classification of South Korean Generations





































































































a. Ideological/Political Cohort Experiences 
Park Jae-heung classifies South Koreans into three big generations. As graphically 
depicted in Figure 2, first is Colonization and War generation, including people born in 
1910–1940. Next is Industrialization and Democratization generation, with people born in 
1941–1970. Last is Post-ideological and Information age generation, with people born in 
1971 to current.43 Park believes the post-ideological generation will continue in the South 
Korean society until the next ground-breaking historical event, such as Korean 
reunification, that could cause another cohort experience. He uses the political environment 
in South Korea and its associated ideology as two methods to classify generations. For the 
first generation, he uses Japanese colonial rule and War-time governance as key historical 
environments that have structured the “Colonization and War” generation. Also, Park uses 
ethnic nationalism and anti-communism as fundamental ideologies during those times. For 
the second generation, Park uses authoritarian dictatorship, military coup’s, and the era of 
democratization protests as key political environments. He associates the rise of liberalism 
and national autonomy/autarky as fundamental ideologies. For the last generation, he 
identifies progressive administrations, 1988 Seoul Olympic and 2002 FIFA World Cup, 
and candlelight vigils as key political and social environments that shaped the generation. 
Park claims three ideologies as the fundamental ideological perspective of this generation: 
consumerism, individualism, and anti-authoritarianism.44  
Similarly, Choi Ji-young and her team use the political cohort experiences driven 
by key historical events as the classification factors. Choi divides South Korean society 
into four generations, and this classification is graphically presented in Figure 2.45 First is 
Babyboomer generation (born in 1955–1961), who experienced the authoritarian Yushin 
order (1972) and 5.18 Uprising (1980) against the authoritarian suppression during their 
high-school years. Second is 386-generation (born in 1962–1969), who experienced June 
Uprising (1987), a public protest that brought the end of the authoritarian military 
 
43 Jae-Heung Park, Generational Difference and Conflict: Theory and Reality, 100. 
44 Jae-Heung Park, Generational Difference and Conflict: Theory and Reality, 99. 
45 Jiyoung Choi, Heejoo Cheon, and Myoung-jin Lee, “A Comparative Study of the Civility Across 
Generations in Korean Society,” Korea Journal of Population Studies 38, no. 4 (December 2015), 121–22. 
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government, and 1988 Seoul Olympic as they were young. The third is X-generation (born 
in 1970–1978), who experienced both a stable and prosperous society as South Korea has 
joined the United Nations (UN) and OECD as well as financial decline during International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) crisis. Fourth and last, N-generation (born in 1979–1992) has 
nourished the full-tide of globalization highlighted by the 2002 FIFA Korea-Japan World 
Cup and the spread of the internet. As being the child of baby-boomers, N-generation 
shows very distinct generational characteristics from their parents’ generational 
characteristics.46  Choi does not classify beyond the N-generation due to insufficient data 
available on the younger population under the voting age. 
b. Economic Cohort Experiences 
As classifying the difference between generations, Choi and her team also account 
for the income level of South Korean citizens when each generation has entered the 
working-age. In their research, Choi correlates the economic level of each age-group with 
their generational characteristics in terms of autonomy and civility. Babyboomer 
generation (1955-1961) had an income level of $563-$1,686. Next, 386-generation (1962-
1969) had an income level of $1,842-$4,653, and X-generation (1970-1978) with $5,718-
$12,059. Lastly, N-generation (1979-1992) had an income level of $7,989-$24,302. Choi 
concludes in her article that as the income level increased, generational perceptions on 
autonomy and civility have also increased—with the exception of N-generation. 47 
Autonomy and civility rating has rather decreased for N-generation, showing much more 
similarity with the rating of Babyboomer generation. She explains this with similarity in 
the social environment that N-generation is experiencing with those of Babyboomer had 
experienced. Babyboomers entered into the labor market with full of uncertainty and 
competition. This similar economic setting is repeating for N-generation. Although N-
generation makes more than ten-fold of Babyboomers made at the time, people in N-
generation see a less optimistic future in an already fully saturated economy.48 
 
46 Jiyoung Choi, Heejoo Cheon, and Myoung-jin Lee, “A Comparative Study of the Civility,” 121–22. 
47 Jiyoung Choi, Heejoo Cheon, and Myoung-jin Lee, “A Comparative Study of the Civility,” 130. 
48 Jiyoung Choi, Heejoo Cheon, and Myoung-jin Lee, “A Comparative Study of the Civility,” 131–32. 
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Another scholar, Hong Duk-ryul investigates generational classification using 
economic cohort experience. As graphically depicted in Figure 2, he divides the South 
Korean society into Industrialization generation, Democratization generation (two sub-
generations during this period), and Information Age generation. 49  First is 
Industrialization generation, consists of people who achieved the industrialization during 
their prime age, anyone born before the year 1952. The main concern of the 
Industrialization generation was a struggle for daily survival and protecting their family 
through extreme uncertainty and poverty.50 Hard labor and sacrifice for the future became 
the norm of this generation, and its first priority became the escape from poverty. This 
social atmosphere was the backbone of the industrial movement under President Park 
Chung-hee.51 
The next classified generation is the Democratization generation. This generation 
consists of people who were born between 1953 and 1969.52 Although this generation 
widely shares the same principles and values across within the group, Hong suggests 
dividing the Democratization generation into two groups based on economic experiences. 
The earlier age-group, who were born between 1953 and 1960, is named “first phase” of 
Democratization generation, and later age-group, who were born between 1961 and 1970, 
is named “second phase” of Democratization generation.53 The first phase generation is 
synonymous to Baby-boomers, who still had memories of poverty and physical deprivation. 
People who formed the first phase generation have internalized both industrialization 
values and democratization values and eagerly fought for prospering and stable lifestyle as 
well as more freedom under the democracy.54 The second phase generation is synonymous 
to 386-ers, who was brought up with more stability in their life compared to the first phase. 
 
49 Duk-ryul Hong, “Korean Society and Generations Research (한국사회의 세대 연구),” Critical 
Review of History (August 2003), 161. 
50 Duk-ryul Hong, “Korean Society and Generations Research,” 162. 
51 Duk-ryul Hong, “Korean Society and Generations Research,” 163. 
52 Duk-ryul Hong, “Korean Society and Generations Research,” 168. 
53 Duk-ryul Hong, “Korean Society and Generations Research,” 168. 
54 Duk-ryul Hong, “Korean Society and Generations Research,” 171. 
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Also, under the 1981 Education Reform, the college education became widely available to 
the population, and the second phase generation was the first group that entered college 
more universally. As college students and white-collar workers, second phase generations 
started to organize into political groups in the school and civil society, and they joined the 
fight against the violence and suppression along with the first phase generation.  
Hong classifies the last generation as Information Age generation, which consists 
of everyone who was born after 1970. As the second phase of democratization generation 
was the first generation to escape from poverty and starvation, this younger age-group is 
the first generation who was raised in economic prosperity and consumeristic society. 
Economic spending has progressed from fulfilling material needs to indulging cultural and 
service needs. Socially, the internet and personal computer became the norm of 
Information Age generation. Getting information became easier than ever, and worldwide 
communication was at the people’s fingertips. This generation started to make trips to 
foreign nations without any constraints and easily accepts the different cultures and ideas. 
Thus, the Information Age generation differs from the previous two generations that young 
South Koreans are now expressing themselves and fulfilling emotional values.55  
Steven Denney largely takes a similar generational classification and explanation 
from existing studies, but he concentrates on another generation that has recently formed—
the youngest generation.56 He has borrowed the label for this new generation, Give-Up 
generation, from the phrase what the young South Koreans are referring to themselves. 
This generation was brought up in the reshaped society where the liberal-democratic mode 
of government was structured after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.57 Asian Financial 
Crisis, which is known as the IMF crisis to most South Koreans, signaled the end of 
industrialization and the rapid development era of previous generations. After economic 
 
55 Duk-ryul Hong, “Korean Society and Generations Research,” 183. 
56 Steven Denney, “Bringing Generational Analysis Back In? An Interview with Shelley Rigger,” 
SINO-NK, January 18, 2016, https://sinonk.com/2016/01/18/bringing-generational-analysis-back-in-an-
interview-with-shelley-rigger/. 
57 Steven Denney, “Number of Irregular Workers Continue to Rise in South Korea,” The Diplomat, 
November 10, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/number-of-irregular-workers-continue-to-rise-in-
south-korea/. 
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reformation happened during the IMF crisis, South Korean society had no more “lifetime 
jobs” or “iron rice bowl,” which the people are guaranteed to keep employed until their 
retirement age with social benefits provided, such as pensions and insurances. Instead, 
many of the workforces were replaced by irregular workers, who are either on sub-contract 
or a short-period contract. This new system makes the labor market more flexible, but 
increase instability and inequality within the society.58 Give-up generation South Koreans 
were raised in this unhappy childhood. They are currently working part-time jobs to pay 
college tuition, but even if they graduate from college, they cannot get a good job. 
Therefore, South Koreans in the 20s and 30s are started to believe that they are forced to 
give up life events such as marriage, owning a home, and raising children.59 Denney 
characterizes this young generation as more active in politics than its predecessors, to 
overcome and change the “Hell Chosun,” a reference to the rigid social hierarchies with no 
hope.  
These studies have several characteristics in common. First, they agree upon a 
generational gap between people who have experienced extreme poverty and those who 
have not (that is, between people who were born before and after 1960). Second, a 
generational gap between people who have lived their younger adult lives under 
authoritarian rule and those who have not (people who were born before and after 1970). 
Last, there is a new generation currently emerging, the youngest generation, that seems 
different from its predecessors.  
With this general consensus in mind, this thesis research proposes four generational 
classifications, also shown in Figure 2: the War Generation, the Transition/386 Generation, 
the Democratic Generation, and the New Generation. The War Generation consists of 
people who were born before the year 1960. This generation might also be known as the 
Cold War ideology generation, and it represents elders in current South Korean society 
over age 61. The Transition/386 Generation includes people who were born between 1960 
 
58 Steven Denney, “Number of Irregular Workers Continue to Rise in South Korea.” 
59 Kookmin Ilbo, “The young and sick. ‘5-po’ to ‘7-po,’ the ‘give up’ generation,” August 28, 2015, 
http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0923219431&code=11131100&cp=nv 
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and 1970 (and retains “386” to allow continuity with existing discussions on generational 
dynamics, where “386” is perhaps the only universally-used term). This generation’s 
members struggled to achieve democratization in the 1980s and are currently in the age 
between 51 to 60. This research will classify the next decade’s cohort as the Democratic 
Generation, born between 1970 and 1980. These South Koreans, where the majority of 
people in their 40s, likely have political characteristics similar to 386 Generation but social 
characteristics similar to the younger generation. Finally, the New Generation consists of 
people born after 1981, who are currently in the age between 21–40. This generation is 
expected to be found to support new changes in the old order and to challenge perceived 
irrationalities therein, such as corrupt officials, unfairness, and social injustice. In Chapter 
II, these proposed generational classifications will be analyzed in detail. 
4. Classification of Left and Right in South Korea 
When discussing generational effects on politics in South Korea, it will be 
important to both connect these to and differentiate them from more familiar progressive-
versus-conservative political-spectrum influences. Attitudes toward the U.S.-ROK alliance 
and security dependence on the United States are key factors dividing progressives from 
conservatives in South Korea. South Korea also displays stronger associations of apparent 
left/right characteristics with people’s region and generation, and weaker associations with 
policy and ideology, than in most consolidated democracies.  
As Seymour Lipset claims, the political left and right are a by-product of modern 
industrial society.60 In European society, the political spectrum typically reflects a division 
based on socioeconomic class and economic/material matters, such as distribution versus 
growth, labor versus capital, and state versus the market.61 However, in the South Korean 
case, political ideologies are often associated with different age groups and generations 
who hold historical and ideological traces. For example, members of what this thesis will 
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call the War Generation are often referred to by their political opponents as “extreme 
reactionaries” (수구꼴통) who still hold glorious memories of an authoritarian regime, while 
members of what this thesis will call the Transition/386 Generation are often called “Pro-
North Korean Sympathizers” (종북) by opponents pointing out cooperative gestures towards 
North Korea. 
Among the many issues over which the South Korean left and right sharply disagree, 
the ROK’s relationships with North Korea and the United States are perhaps the ones over 
which attitudes diverge the most. Kang Won-taek relates these divergent views on North 
Korea to a generational conflict over political ideology—an ideological fight between anti-
communist old conservatives and anti-authoritarian young progressives. 62  The 
conservative right takes a harder line toward North Korea, driven by anti-communism, 
while progressive left takes a more engagement-friendly line toward North Korea, driven 
by the genuine support for North Korean citizens and lack of anti-communist ideology. 
Thus, Kang explains, conservatives in South Korea still hold fundamental values of anti-
communism and authoritarian social order as their core beliefs. At the same time, the 
political left, the progressives, holds fundamental beliefs supporting disbanding outdated 
Cold-War era anti-communism and all remnants of South Korea’s authoritarian period. 
One example of pro-engagement progressive policies is President Kim Dae-jung’s 
Sunshine Policy toward North Korea. The Sunshine Policy is a Korean version of Détente: 
a warm-hearted gesture and peaceful engagement to North Korea that aims to gradually 
reduce the tension and encourage reforms within the North by establishing economic and 
cultural links.63 Another example is President Moon Jae-in’s commemoration of Kim 
Won-bong during his Korean Memorial Day speech.64 Kim Won-bong was a Korean 
independence activist during the Japanese colonial period. Although he had many 
achievements as an independence activist, his name was rarely brought up in South Korean 
history because he became a leader of the North Korean Communist Party after the 
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Liberation.65 President Moon Jae-in’s commemoration of Kim Won-bong signifies that 
progressive’s step toward leaving outdated ideological conflict and revise the history which 
was written during the conservative authoritarian regimes. 
The youngest, “New” Generation members identify as firm supporters of a strong 
and independent Korea, but at the same time as “national security conservatives” on North 
Korean issues, like older anti-communist conservatives.66 Denney claims that the New 
Generation both takes a more hardline approach toward North Korea and believes that a 
Strong Korea means an independent Korea and that this belief comes from their experience 
growing up with South Korea as a major power in the region. To these young South 
Koreans in their 20s, the concept of a strong Japan is not in their memory, and China is not 
as advanced as South Korea industrially, culturally, and technologically. 67  Their 
perception is much different than that of previous generations, and this new perception is 
driving their self-confidence and emphasis on an independent South Korea.68 
Meanwhile, South Koreans traditionally have held strong pro-American feelings 
based on a strong alliance with the United States, which helped protect and nurture South 
Korea during and after the Korean War. However, a growing segment of the population 
expresses skepticism toward the United States, or in more extreme cases and in the eyes of 
stronger conservative critics, has been turning anti-American. Hahm Chai-bong argues that 
this is due to different strains of nationalist ideology, which he argues help form the 
foundations of a deep cleavage between South Korean conservatives and progressives.69 
In the early days of the ROK, South Korean nationalism was built around the concept of 
anti-communism, industrialization, and democracy. Hahm argues that early conservative 
and progressive activists shared this nationalism, but with different priorities. 
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Conservatives supporting authoritarian leader Park Chung-hee prioritized industrialization 
and development, while progressives supporting anti-regime figures (and eventual 
presidents) Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung prioritized democratization. However, 
neither right nor left had anti-American sentiments because they both saw the United States 
as a security and economic benefactor.70 
The next generation of progressives was different. Rapid industrialization in the 
1960s and 1970s left dark blots and fierce scars on South Korean society, such as inhuman 
labor conditions and dehumanizing repression by the authoritarian military regime. The 
younger generations who grew up amid this social turmoil began to search for deeper 
structural causes, and they blamed what they saw as the imperialistic interests of the United 
States and the scourge of the capitalistic system. Hahm argues that anti-capitalist and anti-
imperialist nationalism quickly spread, especially at universities, and that these new 
progressives believed themselves to be the only true nationalists following the direct 
lineage of colonial-period anti-Japanese freedom fighters.71 Chun’s bloody repression of 
public demonstrations in Gwangju only confirmed young progressives’ idea that the United 
States was supporting a brutal dictator in South Korea to maintain U.S. imperialistic 
hegemony in East Asia against the Soviets.72 It followed that progressives in South Korea 
were linked with anti-American attitudes – and the American presence also became linked 
with pro-North Korean attitudes, since North Korea, unlike South Korea, had not allowed 
foreign troops on its soil or compromised its autonomy and sovereignty due to the influence 
of superpower nations.73 
In summary, South Korean conservative attitudes can be seen as rooted in an older 
South Korean national identity and ideology, based on development, authoritarianism, and 
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anti-communism. Progressives have confronted this tradition and called for change, 
prioritizing welfare, egalitarianism, and reconciliation with North Korea.74  
The unique history of South Korea has thus created a different kind of nationalism 
for older and younger generations, and these nationalisms have helped drive the split 
between—and correlated with—political left/right divisions in South Korean. Therefore, 
this research will analyze the left/right characteristics associated with the generations and 
assess how these left/right ideologies intertwine with each generation’s security policy and 
perception.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis aims to assess the generational effects on security issues. It first 
investigates whether or not a significant aging or cohort effect exists on these issues in 
South Korea. The null hypothesis is that no distinct difference exists among South Korean 
age cohorts with regard to security. That is, this thesis will investigate whether any 
difference seems to exist, even if modest. 
Public opinion poll data are analyzed to investigate this. Also, the historical case 
analysis is pursued to collect evidence that either rejects or supports generational effects—
for example, whether the Transition/386 Generation exhibited coherent political behavior 
during the 17th and 18th Presidential elections.  
In order to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that a generational influence on 
national security issues does exist, the public opinion poll data and case analysis of security 
issues, such as policies toward North Korea and U.S. forces in Korea, should show coherent 
trends according to age-cohorts, whether in alignment with or distinct from the effects of 
political left and right.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis first conducts an in-depth assessment of different South Korean 
generations and whether and how each generation displays different perceptions. By 
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analyzing high-impact events and crises in South Korean history, key generational 
characteristics that shaped specific cohorts’ experience will be identified. Once South 
Korean generations are defined and qualitatively analyzed, open-source public opinion poll 
data are used to quantitatively assess predicted generational effects and their impacts on 
security issues including 1) people’s perceptions of North Korea, 2) perceptions of the 
United States and the U.S. Forces in Korea, and 3) perceptions on ROK national autonomy 
and their ability to achieve a self-help national security. Opinion polls are used from Gallup 
Korea, Asan Institute, and other reputable news media. When needed, their data will be 
reconstructed to show how results vary according to generation, as newly delineated by 
this study, and by region, partisan identity and other relevant factors.  
Although there was a recent scandal in South Korea regarding the credibility of 
domestic opinion polls. Joongang Daily, a major news media agency in South Korea, 
recently published a journal article criticizing some polling agencies that their survey 
method is vulnerable to intentional “manipulation.” 75 However, even if the poll data 
results are distorted due to political pressure, the data credibility and argument in this thesis 
would not be affected. This thesis only analyzes the difference in data points within a data 
set (between age-groups, regions, and self-identified political identities) and not comparing 
general results between different opinion surveys. Thus, unless the “manipulation” is 
targeted to a specific age group or a region, which is highly unlikely, the data analysis in 
this thesis is not affected by the credibility criticism.  
Also, since this thesis only analyzes the existing opinion polls from polling 
agencies, the questions asked in the poll data are not a perfect fit to assess the generational 
perceptions in three criteria. The quality of analysis could be enhanced by creating 
dedicated questionnaires and conduct an opinion polling with a scientifically constructed 
methodology. However, this thesis has carefully selected the only significant opinion polls 
among a large pool of data depository to maximize the credibility and accuracy of the 
analysis.  
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND OUTLINE 
The thesis will be composed of four chapters. The remainder of the thesis will 
consist of three additional chapters to characterize, analyze, and evaluate the generational 
differences in South Korea.  
Chapter II differentiate and identify the generational characteristics of the four 
South Korean generations. First, this chapter examines the South Korean history to identify 
cohort experiences from historical events and social environment. Then, the generational 
characteristics are assessed using the identified cohort experience, which forms distinct 
identities and tendencies on social, economic, and security issues for each generation. Also, 
the chapter concludes with comparisons of generations based on their political tendencies, 
identifying how much impact a generational difference can create on South Korea politics 
through assessing historical voting results and population size. 
Chapter III provides an in-depth analysis of the generational effect on numerous 
security issues that South Korea faces. This chapter analyzes the public opinion poll data 
to test the security perception of each generation that is identified in Chapter II. Also, 
through trend analysis of various poll data, this chapter assesses how much consistency is 
in the South Korean generational perspectives on North Korean issues, U.S.-ROK 
relationship issues, and South Korean autonomy issues. 
Finally, the thesis concludes with Chapter IV, summarizing the findings and 
supporting evidence. In this last chapter, the thesis provides recommendations for U.S. 
policymakers on what to expect from the upcoming, currently-younger South Korean 
generations, and what the United States leadership and Department of Defense should do 
with this in mind in order to continue and strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
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II. FORMATION AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOUTH 
KOREAN GENERATIONS 
A. PROPOSED CLASSIFICATION OF SOUTH KOREAN GENERATIONS 
Karl Mannheim and Ronald Inglehart both suggest that the generations are formed 
from the shared cohort experiences. Also, many scholars have attempted to identify and 
characterize the generational differences in South Korea, as those were briefly discussed 
in the previous chapter. However, what specific events and historical experiences have 
formed different national security perceptions among the South Korean populations? What 
historical contexts have created a shared cohort experience that affects the generational 
perceptions toward North Korea, the United States, and the ROK security autonomy?  
Based on the analysis of ideological/political experiences, economic experiences, 
and social experiences over the last century of South Korean history, this thesis proposes 
to divide the South Korean population into four generations. For each generation, the key 
historical experiences that created a cohort effect on that generation will be discussed. Then, 
distinctive generational characteristics that are created by the cohort effect will be analyzed. 
Also, at the end of the historical examination, the four generations will be compared and 
contrasted to assess the differences in their generational characteristics. 
Although the generational discussion will be comprehensive as it will include social, 
political, and economic cohort experiences, the main focus of this thesis is about different 
generational perceptions on the national security issue. Thus, some generational 
characteristics that are irrelevant to the U.S.-ROK alliance and national security will be 
carefully omitted from the discussion. Also, the cohort experience is defined by Mannheim 
as experience in people’s youth between the ages of seventeen and twenty-five (17-25), 
but this thesis uses experience in people’s youth between the ages of fifteen and twenty-
five (15-25) for easier calculation, with some vague overlaps between generations.76 A 
person’s life experience is influenced by many different factors at different times of life, 
so the life experience of one who was born a day earlier would not be radically different 
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from the life experience of another who was born a day later. Therefore, the born-year 
range of a generation should take as a rough reference of a general mass who had similar 
experiences, with indistinct borders between the generations.  
1. War Generation (Age: 61 and Older) 
The War Generation was born before 1959. Everyone in this generation had 
finished its formative (age 15–25) period by the mid-1980s and is currently age 61 or older 
(if, for simplicity’s sake, this thesis counts everyone’s birthday as being January 1). 
The first half of twentieth-century history is not cheerful moments for Korea. Korea 
was a victim of the imperialist powers that scourged into the Asian land and waters. Being 
unable to modernize in time and defend its sovereignty, Korea was eventually colonized 
by its neighbor, Imperial Japan. After World War II, Korea liberated from the Japanese 
occupation. However, the nation was soon divided into half by the two superpower 
nations—the United States and the Soviet Union, and eventually became the site of an 
ideological proxy war. After three years of tragic war experience, South Koreans had to 
suffer from both internal and external existential threats—unstable domestic politics and 
extreme poverty, as well as the North Korean aggression. From these experiences, South 
Koreans, who were born before 1959, became highly interested in materialistic values, 
physical stability, and the Cold-War ideology.  
Also, another key highlight of War Generation is that this generation has lived 
through three social ages: Agrarian, Industrial, and Information. As a result of compressed 
modernization of South Korea, people from the War Generation were born in agrarian 
society, worked in industrial society, and spending their sunset years in the information 
society.77 Therefore, it is natural that this older generation kept the agrarian value of 
tradition and Confucian-style ruler–subject relations. Also, the War Generation values the 
stability and social order over individual rights. This tendency stems from the cohort effect 
that the War Generation has suffered from numerous sudden political/societal revolutions 
and periods of re-adaptations, and the tendencies reinforced by the aging effect, as they 
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gradually became the oldest generation in the South Korean society. To the War Generation, 
physical security, social stability, and economic growth are the top priorities, even if the 
civil rights or individual freedom are compromised. These priorities were a good-match 
with the authoritarian-style growth model—which gave public legitimacy to the South 
Korean authoritarianism. 
a. Historical Events and Unique Social Experiences 
(1) Legacy of the Japanese Colonial Period and the Liberation of 1945 
Although there are not many survivors in the War Generation who actually lived 
through the Japanese colonial period. Even if there are, they would be at least 90 years old 
now. However, the legacy of the Japanese colonial period and Liberation has its biggest 
impact on the War Generation, as people from the War Generation had more interaction 
daily with those who lived through this period and experienced the tragic outcome 
originated from this period.  
Living through the Japanese colonial period, South Koreans have developed a 
strong sense of ethnic nationalism and this led the War Generation to perceive entire Korea 
(both North and South) as one ethnic-nation, not as separated states. During the Japanese 
colonial period, Koreans were an ethnic group without a nation. Korea had many centuries 
of autonomy as an ethnic nation-state, and Koreans shared a unique culture, language, and 
heritage from other nations (i.e., China, Japan). Until the colonial period, the Korean nation 
had unified government for more than 1,000 years, and Korean ethnicity was stabilized 
with well-defined territorial boundaries.78 Thus, losing sovereignty and nation by the 
imperial power sparked two distinctive reactions: the rise of moderate and radical 
nationalisms. The rise of these two different types of nationalism planted the seed for the 
tragedy of the divided nation. By the 1920s, there was a division among Korean 
intellectuals and nationalist activists, between Western-looking moderate nationalists and 
more radical nationalists who took their inspirations from the Soviet Union and 
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communism.79 Although their ultimate goals were different, these two nationalists groups 
both shared a short-term goal under the Japanese colonial period: independence and 
reestablishment of the Korean ethnic-nation state. With this deep ideological trench 
between two different nationalist groups left unresolved, Korea gained liberation in 1945 
with Japan’s surrender.  
(2) Ideological Battle and Korean War 
Similar to other newly formed modern states after World War II, Korea also became 
a vicious battleground between two ideologies: free-liberal democracy and communism. 
Once Korea liberated from Japanese occupation, the United States and the Soviet Union 
decided to temporarily divide the Korean peninsula along the arbitrary 38th parallel line to 
disarm the remaining Japanese forces in Korea.80 Although it was not intended, this line 
became the ideological border between the free-liberal South and the communist North 
when two sides conducted their own election and declared a state in 1947–1948.81 South 
Korea, under the influence of Rhee Syng-man and the United States Military Government 
in Korea (USAMGIK), became a free-liberal democracy. However, President Rhee’s 
political ground was still weak and unstable, and he needed more consolidated power to 
defeat his opponents and the communists. Thus, he was not reluctant to use ideological 
politics to oppress opponents and control the newly formed nation.82 From this political 
and social environment, the War Generations grew up under the national priority of anti-
communism and “march north and unify Korea (북진통일).”83 
Before the Korean War broke out, the border between the two Koreas was much 
more porous than today. During this period, many communists from the South fled to the 
North, and free-liberal activists from the North fled to the South. However, people still 
 
79 Michael Seth, A Concise History of Modern Korea, 58. 
80 Michael Seth, A Concise History of Modern Korea, 94–95. 
81 Michael Seth, A Concise History of Modern Korea, 102–03. 
82 Michael Seth, A Concise History of Modern Korea, 107–08. 
83 Scott Snyder, South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Power 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 20. 
35 
believed that this division is temporary, and soon Korea will be unified under one ethnic-
nation state. Many War Generation South Koreans were still lived in North Korea at this 
time. They saw their friends, neighbors, and families were getting suppressed and purged 
by communist extremists. Also, in the South, the War Generation had experienced riots 
and strikes led by discontent labor workers and communists that caused many casualties in 
Yeosu, Daegu, and Busan.84 Finally, in June 1950, the Korean War broke out. During the 
war, it was natural to put the defense of the nation and the obedience to order above 
individual rights and civil liberty. Also, the military-style authoritarian leadership and the 
anti-communist sentiment were widely utilized to consolidate the nation and fight the war 
against the same ethnic Koreans—sometimes against one’s own family and neighbors. 
After the war, the North Korean aggression persisted, exemplified by the 1968 USS Pueblo 
incident and assassination attempts in the same year by North Korean infiltrators to Blue 
House (Cheong Wa Dae), the South Korean Presidential Office. Thus, the wartime social 
environment of ideological authoritarianism and heavy control has continued to ensure 
security and stability, and this environment became the foundation of authoritarian regimes 
in Korea after the war.  
(3) Earlier Authoritarian Regimes 
Most of everyone born in 1959 or earlier experienced their formative years (age 
15–25) under the authoritarian regimes of Rhee and Park, whose rule ended in 1979. Early 
days of the authoritarian government were justified by the hostile geopolitical environment 
that ROK faced and the Cold War ideological confrontation, especially from the direct 
threat from North Korea.85 This national threat from North Korea and the ideological battle 
against the communist front led the deployment of South Korean troops to Vietnam in 1964. 
The decision was made by President Park Chung-hee, “motivated by his drive to build 
legitimacy, lift Korea out of poverty, and prevent U.S. disengagement from Korea.”86 His 
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motivation for the Vietnam War provides a good summary of the historical environment 
that South Korean authoritarian regimes were facing at the time.  
Similar to other authoritarian states, South Korean authoritarian leaders also used 
force and violence to oppress their oppositions and maintain domestic stability. In return, 
authoritarian governments were focused on overcoming the existential threat problem and 
achieving economic development to maintain its popular legitimacy. Before achieving the 
miracles of the Han river with their hands, the people from the War Generation struggled 
for its daily survival. The starvation and poverty were common, and people had faced some 
serious military threats from North Korea, such as secret infiltration attempts and 
provocations at sea.87 With a devastated post-war economy, early ROK governments were 
heavily dependent on the U.S.-ROK alliance for its security and economy.88 Between 1953 
to 1961, a total of $ 1.9 billion of U.S. aids was poured into South Korea to reconstruct and 
keep it from collapsing. 89  Also, during the same period, U.S. aids consisted of 
approximately 40% of the ROK national budget. 90  People from the War Generation 
remembers the United States as the protector and benefactor of South Korea, as their life 
was once sustained by the support from the United States.  
The ROK economy finally took off in 1962 as President Park Chung-hee took 
power through a military coup and conducted developmental reforms. The rapid 
industrialization under the authoritarian rule is a key phenomenon of the War Generation 
cohort experience, as it was the hard work and sacrifices of the War Generation that built 
the foundation of South Korea’s development from the ashes of war.91 According to World 
Bank data, South Korea had a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of merely $100 in 
 
87 Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, The Evolution of the South Korea-United States, 140. 
88 Scott Snyder, South Korea at the Crossroads, 16–17. 
89 Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, The Evolution of the South Korea-United States, 163–64. 
90 Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, The Evolution of the South Korea-United States, 163–64. 
91 Jae-Heung Park, Generational Difference and Conflict: Theory and Reality, 64. 
37 
the early 1960s, but it increased by 100-fold by 1994 with GDP per capita of $10,205, 
which again doubled by 2006.92  
However, behind these shining achievements, there were issues that were 
developed in the shadows, such as corruption, power abusing, social inequality between 
business and laborer, and human rights violations. Also, President Park declared the Yushin 
order in 1972, which began the dictatorship and ended the quasi-democracy that was 
achieved through the 4.19 Revolution. Eventually, the social resistance against the rapid 
industrialization and the suppression of civil liberty has developed, and this social 
movement became the political backbone of the anti-authoritarian progressives in South 
Korean politics. This explains why the War Generation is not completely conservative in 
current South Korean politics. 
(4) 4.19 Revolution 
Sometimes it is overshadowed by the strong conservatism of the War Generation 
that this older generation was the first generation who experienced a series of public 
protests against the dictatorship. Longing for liberal democratization usually only ties with 
the 386-generation, but it is important that without the War Generation setting the 
precedents, the 386-generation could not have achieved the full democratization during its 
time.93 
One key historical event of this democratic movement is the 4.19 Revolution in 
1960. President Rhee Syng-man, at the end of his third elected term, was not yet ready to 
step down. Coming to the 1960 Presidential Election, Rhee had lost popular support for his 
corruption and abusive power. However, he manipulated the election and won his fourth 
term in March 1960.94 Responding to this fraud election, angry public stormed out to 
massive protests around the entire country. The demonstration peaked on April 19, 1960, 
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where tens of thousands of students came out to protest, and President Rhee proclaimed 
Martial Law and mobilized military. 95  Eventually, with domestic and international 
pressure, Rhee resigned and left Korea for exile in Hawaii. The 4.19 Revolution signifies 
the first successful democratic movement against the illegal authoritarianism in ROK. 
Also, the 1960 revolution was largely led by students, and the students of 1960 are in their 
70s and early 80s in today—which is not a small age-cohort in South Korea. In sum, the 
War Generation holds strong value in the stable social order through some level of 
authority, but the people from the War Generation want this authority under the 
frameworks of democracy. 
b. Generational Characteristics 
Analyzing the historical events, the generational characteristics of the War 
Generation can be identified as four major categories based on its unique experiences. 
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Table 3. Generational Characteristics of the War Generation 
Key Cohort 
Environment Key Cohort Experience Event Year Cohort Effects 
Japanese 
Occupation   1910-1945 
(1) Ethnic Nationalism 
(1) Anti-Japanese Nationalism 
  
Liberation 1945 (4) Ideological Conflict 







  1948-1960 
(2) Materialistic Survival 
(Poverty, Security) 
(4) Anti-North Korea 
(4) Pro-American 




  1963-1979 
(3) Industrialization 
(2) Development  
(Improving Life Standard) 
(3) Controlled Society 
  
Troops in Vietnam War 1964-1973 
(4) Anti-Communism 
(4) Supporting Alliance 
(3) Enhanced National Status 
Blue House Infiltration 1968 (4) Anti-North Korea 
USS Pueblo Incident 1968 (4) Anti-North Korea 
Yushin Constitution Reform 1972 (3) Civil Liberty Restrictions 
Note: (1) through (4) indicate four categories of the generational characteristic 
 
The first category (1) of the generational characteristic of the War Generation is the 
ethnic nationalism. The Korean ethnic-nationalism was developed through the Japanese 
colonial period, stemmed from the anti-Japanese, anti-Imperialist ideology. Along with 
strong anti-Japanese sentiment, the War Generation also believes that two Koreas should 
be reunified as one ethnic nation-state—because Koreans are one ethnic group despite the 
ideological differences.  
The second category (2) of the generational characteristic is the War Generation’s 
priorities on survival and materialistic stability. The War Generation went through wars 
and extreme poverty in their formative years. Also, in fact, North Korea had a better 
economy and military power than South Korea through the 1970s, so people from the War 
Generation lived in constant fear of another potential North Korean invasion or sudden 
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collapse of the free-democratic ROK government by communist spies.96 Thus, this real 
security threat and material deficiency formed a shared social mentality of “development-
first, get out of poverty,” even it required personal sacrifices and limited civil rights.97  
The third category (3) of the generational characteristic is the War Generation’s 
leaning support for the legacies of authoritarian periods. The War Generation grew up and 
became the conservatives in the ROK society holding the legacies from their formative 
experiences. These legacies are strict yet stable society, strong national security, 
ideological superiority over communism, loyalty to the nation, and achieving rapid 
industrialization under authoritarian developmental policies. 98  Later, this generation 
became the political stronghold for the conservative parties and government 
administrations (i.e., Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye), that kept their political lineage 
to the achievements of authoritarian regimes. 
The fourth category (4) of the generational characteristic is strong anti-communists, 
anti-North Korean, and pro-American values. Experiencing the Cold War environment, 
people from the War Generation became somewhat zealous about its ideological belief. 
For example, under the authoritarian regime, if one showed a slight tint of anti-
Americanism, that person automatically got branded as a communist and North Korea 
sympathizer. To the War Generation, the United States is the great benefactor that 
preserved the free-Korea and provided food aids, and the U.S.-ROK alliance signifies the 
true friendship between the two nations—mostly unquestioned.99 However, this thesis 
does not factor out the different views within the generation. As shown through the 4.19 
Revolution, the War Generation also supports democratic values and progressive agendas. 
However, in general, more conservative tendencies are expressed by the majority of the 
War Generation. 
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2. Transition/386 Generation (Age: 51–60) 
The Transition/386 Generation was born between 1960–1969. The people from the 
Transition/386 Generation experienced their formative years (age 15–25) between 1975–
1994 and are mostly in their 50s in current South Korean society. 
Transition/386 Generation grew up in a heavily controlled society under the 
dictatorship of President Park Chung-hee and bloody suppression under President Chun 
Doo-hwan. As they were growing up, people from the Transition/386 Generation pondered 
the discrepancies between what they were taught in the school about democracy and social 
liberty, and what the reality showed on the Cold War ideology and heavily controlled 
society under the authoritarian military government. This generation has questioned and 
acted on the social issues stemming from a lack of liberal democracy and human rights 
under the authoritarian society in the 1970s and 80s. Also, the Transition/386 Generation 
started to look for an alternative solution to the social problems from the officially banned 
texts of Marx and Lenin, resisting the “ideologically correct” answers that were mandated 
by the government.100 
Also, directly challenging the black-and-white dichotomy of the national identity 
(i.e., anti-communism, anti-North Korea and pro-American), the Transition/386 
Generation started to view the United States as an obstacle and imperialistic intruders, who 
support the dictatorships for its own national interest in East Asia and interrupts the 
reconciliation with North Korea.101 In sum, the Transition/386 Generation has a strong 
tendency toward progressive political opposition to the traditional conservatives, 
represented by the War Generation. In this political stance, this generation shows strong 
support for unorthodox alternatives to building an ideal South Korean society from the 
post-materialistic, post-ideological values—including from once-banned socialism and by 
peacefully engaging with North Korea.102 
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a. Historical Events and Unique Social Experiences 
(1) Improved Economic Stability 
From the hard work and sacrifice of its parents’ generation, the Transition/386 
Generation was benefited from a more stable and improved economic situation. As shown 
in Figure 3, the South Korean GDPs per capita grew exponentially during their formative 
years. With a high annual GDP growth, nearly all sectors of ROK society could enjoy an 
improved lifestyle. It was the beginning of the developmental state industrialization, which 
is often acclaimed by its coined-phrase, “the miracle of the Han river.” In this period of 
rapid growth and modernization, a large portion of the Transition/386 Generation could 
start its youth years in the middle-class status. They no longer had to worry about their 
physical necessity and started to look for post-materialistic values in society. Their main 
question was the issues of an authoritarian society. Eventually, as an educated college 
student in the 1980s, the Transition/386 Generation could no longer validate the previous 
generation’s justification that restricted democracy, violent oppression, and compromised 
civil liberty are necessary to overcome poverty.103  
 
103 Andrei Lankov, “Understanding S. Korea’s ‘386 generation’ and pro-north activists.” 
43 
 
Figure 3. South Korean GDP per Capita (1960–1994) in Current U.S. 
Dollar104 
Also, improved economic stability brought the flourishing of popular culture in this 
generation. Introduction of the professional sports industry, broadcasting in color 
televisions, folk music scenes, and café culture created a unique cohort experience of the 
Transition/386 Generation. 105  The Korean popular culture was largely influenced by 
liberal Western culture, and by adopting the Western culture, young people in the 1970s 
and 1980s started to admire the free and liberal society of the United States and Western 
Europe. Along with this free- and liberal-seeking popular culture, 1982 government policy 
to lift 36-years-old nationwide curfew synergized to create a liberal consumeristic society 
in South Korea. 106  The beginning of consumeristic society differentiates one major 
characteristic distinction between the Transition/386 Generation and the previous War 
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Generation. In the 1980s, the younger generation’s spending habits and popular culture 
were often widely criticized by the War Generation as flamboyant and sinful decadence.107 
However, it was the free and liberal values imported along with the popular culture that 
fueled this generation to fight against authoritarianism and brought democracy in South 
Korea. 
(2) Student Activists 
The Transition/386 Generation is famous for its student activist experience during 
its college years. Even its name, three-eight-six, highlights that this generation is comprised 
of people who were born in the sixties (1960s) and attended college in the eighties (1980s). 
Before the 1980s, South Koreans could not easily access a college education. As shown in 
Figure 4, the percentage of the population enrolled in tertiary education was below 10% 
until 1979, and beginning from the 1980s, the number of enrollment started to increase 
exponentially. Through a series of education system reforms that were conducted in the 
1970s and 1980s, such as 1981 elimination of college entrance quota, that provided easier 
access to the Transition/386 Generation for the college education. With increased college 
enrollment numbers in the 1980s, student activism became more popular and organized. 
As a student, people from the Transition/386 Generation experienced 5.18 Uprising and 
June Uprising, and learn about the hidden social issues like rural-urban inequality, worker’s 
condition, and the state’s suppression of democracy.108  
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Figure 4. Tertiary School Enrollment in South Korea109 
Ironically, the Transition/386 Generation’s longing for democracy and overcoming 
the authoritarianism brought radicalization in their ideology. The act of student 
remonstration of government’s misdeeds is a long historical Korean culture from the 
Joseon Dynasty (1392-1897) and even lasted during the colonial period. However, the 
military authoritarian government under President Park and Chun did not allow to air the 
grievance. 110  Thus, students radicalized and created underground organizations to 
continued their fight against the government. This radicalization brought students seeking 
alternatives to current political and economic systems from banned texts from outside—
such as Marxism, Leninism, and even Juche ideology from North Korea.111 It was the 
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formation of another form of Korean nationalism that rose from this environment. Korean 
society had a long tradition of holding Sadae (사대) ideology, which means that Korea, a 
small power nation, should serve other major power nation to maintain peace and order. 
The Korean nationalists saw deep-rooted Sadae as the biggest obstacle to create 
independent Korea. The nationalists first criticized elites and government officials of 
Joseon for being Sadae. Then they criticized Japanese collaborators during the colonial 
periods and later the pro-American conservatives once the ROK was formed. To the left-
wing nationalist’s perspective, the pro-Americanism is another form of Sadae, and North 
Korean Juche ideologies are the true independent-minded nationalistic solution.112 Many 
student activists were convinced by the nationalist’s argument, which largely influenced 
the left-leaning, pro-North Korea, anti-American values of the Transition/386 Generation. 
This anti-Americanism developed during this era can be exemplified by the series of 
firebombing incidents between 1980–1983 on the American Cultural Centers at numerous 
South Korean cities as a demonstration demanding an apology and stop occupying South 
Korea with the U.S. military.113  
(3) Democratization 
The dictatorship in ROK was formalized by Yushin. or a “revitalization,” 
Constitution Reform of 1972. During this period, President Park Chung-hee had faced both 
increasing discontents from domestic politics and decreased U.S. interest in providing 
security to ROK due to the Détente policy. To secure his presidency and empowers himself 
even more from foreign and domestic oppositions, President Park declares Martial Law in 
1972 and dissolved the National Assembly—followed by writing a new national 
constitution.114 As a result, President Park took full control of the state and society. The 
Transition/386 Generation started their formative years in this environment. What they can 
remember from their birth is strictly controlled society and fear of political violence. As 
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they grew up, they experienced Park Chung-hee’s assassination and another military coup 
in 1979 by General Chun Doo-hwan, who later became another dictator-president. The 
democracy in South Korea even further receded with him in power.115  
However, with increased domestic and international pressure to democracy, ROK 
shifted from military dictatorship to democracy in 1987. Domestically, increasing demand 
of the middle class and student activists continued to escalate. Internationally, the United 
States and international community had a closer eye on the human rights violation and 
misdeeds of the authoritarian regime—especially with ROK hosting the 1988 Olympics. 
In June 1987, a nationwide democratic demonstration grew to an uncontrollable level, 
which was initially sparked by a death of a student under police interrogation, and later 
they started to demand a direct presidential election, end of censorship, releasing political 
prisoners, and removing the obstacles to political activities.116 With no other possible 
options other than another violent crackdown of demonstrators—which the United States 
strongly opposed, President Chun accepted the people’s demand. The presidential election 
of 1987 opened up a new era of democracy in South Korea, with a peaceful transfer of 
power and freely contested race among the Presidential candidates. The Transition/386 
Generation is the generation that experienced the authoritarian military dictatorship, fought 
for democracy, and tasted the first fruit of democratization. Yet, it was not until 1998 when 
the first progressive president was elected, and left-progressive political agendas were 
implemented. Thus, this generation is the “transition” generation who experienced the 
transition from the authoritarian era to the democratic era. 
b. Generational Characteristics 
Analyzing the historical events, the generational characteristics of the Transition/
386 Generation can be identified as four major categories based on its unique experiences. 
Table 4 shows the analyzed cohort effects caused by social environment and cohort 
experiences.  
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Table 4. Generational Characteristics of the Transition/386 Generation 
Key Cohort 




  1963-1979 
(1) Anti-Authoritarianism 
(2) Seeking Autonomy 
(2) Underground Movement  





  1980-1987 
(1) Suppression/Violence 
(2) Left-wing Nationalism 
(2) Underground Movement  
  
5.18 Uprising 1980 (1) Anti-Authoritarianism (1) Anti-American 




(3) Adopting Free/Liberal 
Culture 
Firebombing of American Cultural 
Center (Gwangju, Busan, Daegu) 1980-1983 (1) Anti-American 
College Entrance Reform 1981 (4) Increased Student Activism 




Lift of Nationwide Curfew 1982 
(3) Popular Culture/
Consumerism 
(4) Increased Student Activism 
June Uprising 1987 (4) Democratization (4) Improvement Mentality 
Note: (1) through (4) indicate four categories of the generational characteristic 
 
The first category (1) of the generational characteristic of the Transition/386 
Generation is its strong tendency towards anti-authoritarian, anti-American, and pro-North 
Korean values. These are the complete opposite of the War Generation’s characteristics, as 
the Transition/386 Generation retained its characteristics while resisting the social values 
bestowed by its previous generation. These values are consolidated as the left-progressive 
agenda of South Korean politics. 
The second category (2) of the Transition/386 generational characteristic is the 
strong nationalism for self-help. This characteristic is expressed in two ways: first is its 
tendency to seek autonomy in their policy and decisions by breaking ties in the traditional 
U.S.-ROK interdependence, and second is its tendency of accommodating North Korea, as 
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exemplified by the sunshine policy—a peaceful economic and cultural engagement to 
gradually bring North Korea towards the reformation and reconciliation. Until 1987, South 
Korea had been receiving a significant amount of U.S. military assistance and aids to 
ensure its security and economic growth.117 These client-patron relationship has brought 
South Korean leaders to cooperate to U.S. foreign policies and U.S. political pressures. 
This is well illustrated by President Park’s decision to commit ROK military deployment 
to Vietnam, which the progressives viewed as authoritarian conservatives are sacrificing 
Korean soldiers for U.S. imperialistic ambition. Also, progressives looked at North Korea 
(to be exact, propagandas of North Korea) in contrast to the South, that it thoroughly purged 
the Japanese collaborators and maintained an independent course from Beijing and 
Moscow.118 Therefore, student activists were attracted to North Korea and turning away 
from South Korean conservatives, and this generational characteristics of rejecting Sadae 
to major power, holding autonomy, and anti-Americanism became the banner of the 
Transition/386 Generation.  
The third category (3) of the generational characteristic is the emergence of popular 
cultures and consumeristic society. This generational characteristic was based on their 
cohort experience of the growing economy and liberalization of society. Unlike the War 
Generation, people from the Transition/386 Generation have not seen the extreme poverty 
and aftermaths of the Korean War. They were the first group to nourish the effects of 
industrialization and modernization, which began in the 1970s. As college students, they 
could roam freely after the curfew hours, and they could listen to foreign music and wear 
jeans as a fashion item. Thus, the Transition/386 Generation holds both political liberalism 
as well as cultural liberalism and adaptability.  
The fourth category (4) of the generational characteristic is admiration for an 
egalitarian democratic society and its improvement mentality. The Transition/386 
Generation has experienced the June Uprising of 1987 and obtained democracy as a prize 
of victory against the military dictatorship. This experience of a victory laid the 
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improvement mentality among this generation that people from Transition/386 Generation 
have a strong will and courage to challenge whatever they see as irrational and has room 
for improvement. This mentality gave the Transitional/386 Generation a high participation 
rate on political matters and social issues and made them as a powerful political generation 
that has a massive influence. 
3. Democratic Generation (Age: 40–50) 
The Democratic Generation was born between 1970–1980. The people from the 
Democratic Generation experienced their formative years (age 15–25) between 1985–2005 
and are mostly in their 40s in current South Korean society. 
It was 1989, Berlin Wall came down, and two Germanys reunified soon after. The 
young youths from the Democratic Generation saw this historical event over on color 
television and became optimistic about the reunification of their own nation. This anecdote 
well summarizes the historical environment of the Democratic Generation.  
The people from the Democratic Generation grew up experiencing the post-Cold 
War tranquility and all the positive atmospheres from the victory of liberalism. North 
Korean and South Korean high-level delegations signed an agreement that confirms that 
the two Koreas have a common goal of peaceful reconciliation—signifying the ease of 40-
years of hostile tension between two archenemies. The economic development which 
started from the export-led industrialization and dual-track policy under President Park 
reached its peak during the 1990s, and the South Korean economy completed its 
transformation from light-industry to heavy-industry and hi-tech industry. Automobiles, 
consumer appliances, personal computers, and communications devices were widely 
spread to the public, and South Koreans could freely travel to other nations without 
restrictions. It was an era of globalization and liberalization, and there was no more state 
suppression that threatened people’s life. The Democratic Generation spent their youth in 
this post-ideology, post-authoritarian, and individualistic society. 
Also, one of the biggest distinctions of the Democratic Generation from older 
generations is that this generation no longer has the “third-world complex,” as people from 
the Democratic Generation now see South Korea as a developed economy and a 
51 
modernized society.119 This generation built a strong national pride as growing up, and 
with ROK’s  improved global status, the Democratic Generation wants more independence 
and autonomy away from foreign influences—mainly from the United States. Student 
activism also continued in the 1990s by the Democratic Generation, but instead of fighting 
against the authoritarian suppression for democracy, students voiced social issues like labor 
conditions, social benefits, and reforms based on left-progressive values. Simply put, the 
Democratic Generation succeeded many of the Transition/386 Generation’s characteristics, 
in a more globalized and liberalized environment.  
a. Historical Events and Unique Social Experiences 
(1) Perfecting Liberal Democracy 
In 1987, when the Democratic Generation had just started to enter its formative 
years, the successful June Uprising sentenced the termination to the long-lasted military 
authoritarian regime in South Korea. With the free and fair democratic voting process, the 
people of South Korea elected their president under the mood of an optimistic 
democratization process. President Roh Tae-woo, a key member under the previous 
military regime and a good friend of President Chun, won a close election against split 
opposition between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam.120 The five-year term under 
President Roh Tae-woo was a period of transition from an authoritarian state to liberal 
democracy. He accepted many restraints on his authority in order to create a more 
democratic political order, including giving back independence to ROK’s judiciary 
branch.121 However, a more consolidated liberal democracy that ROK has today did not 
come in overnight. It was not until President Kim Young-sam that put the military under 
the civilian control and cut the close ties between government and chaebols, the family-
owned conglomerate businesses. 
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Also, there was high student activism and radical labor movements under President 
Roh’s period—which often clashed in a violent manner. Yet, the student activists from the 
Democratic Generation had a demand drastically different in ideological value compared 
to their predecessors’ demand, as they witnessed the defeat of communism with the end of 
the Cold War. In other words, neither anti- nor pro-communism were as strong as they had 
been for earlier generations since communism was no longer a real worldwide issue. Thus, 
social movements and protests during this time have moved on from the ideological 
conflict to more focused on creating better labor conditions and earning higher wages. In 
general, student activists from the Democratic Generation had public support and 
understanding since people from the older generations had a sentimental connection with 
student protesters as themselves have once participated in the student demonstration 
against dictatorship and authoritarianism in the past.122 
(2) Political/Economic Superiority over North Korea 
One unique environment under the President Roh administration was its diplomatic 
successes with former communist countries and achieving political/economic superiority 
over the North Korean regime. The Democratic Generation has grown up in a post-
ideological environment, where no more “fabricated” hostility against communism and 
North Korea is required to justify regime stability and legitimacy. Compared to North 
Korea, South Korea in the late 1980s and 1990s had achieved democratic stability, a 
stronger economy, and better foreign relationship with the rest of the world, even including 
China and the Soviet Union (Russia after 1991).123 With this superior mentality, South 
Koreans could now approach North Korea with a more embracing and tolerant stance, 
which led to a more peaceful and cooperative atmosphere with North Korea. In 1991, 
Premieres from two Koreas had signed an Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, 
and Exchanges and Cooperation, which created a roadmap towards reunification in the 
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post-Cold War era.124 Although there were several incidents in this era that brought back 
sudden hostile tension between the two Koreas, more South Koreans started to believe that 
North Korea could not impose a serious security threat to South Korea. South Korean 
people in the 1990s were getting mundane to repeated North Korean threats and having 
more interest in other global matters and the well-being of their lives. Also, South Koreans 
started to believe that peaceful negotiation and mutual trust are a more probable way to 
reconciliation. 
In this mood of reconciliation, the North Korean nuclear and missile program 
became the hot issue in 1993 after Nork Korea announced its intent to withdraw from the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT). The United States started a direct 
negotiation with North Korea as a response to the threat, which was an unprecedented 
diplomatic gesture as well as an undermining move that created discontent in the 
relationship with ROK.125 ROK President Kim Young-sam clearly communicated his 
concerns over the multiple channels, which were 1) South Korea should also be part of 
negotiation, since North Korea issue is the issue of Koreans, 2) The new progressive U.S. 
administration (under President Clinton) is being naïve and does not understand the sly 
North Korean tactics, and 3) The U.S.-North Korea bilateral negotiation could potentially 
weaken the U.S. commitment in the U.S.-ROK alliance and security of South Korea.126 
Consequently, the South Korean public heard these concerns over the media and became 
unhappy towards the United States’ decision. It was a mixed feeling from the South Korean 
public that they want more autonomy and independence away from the United States, but 
at the same time, they need a security guarantee from the United States. 
(3) Rise of National Status 
To the Democratic Generation, South Korea is no longer an under-developed 
country that relies on the nurture and protection of the United States, but a responsible 
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shoulder-to-shoulder partner for world peace and global prosperity. 1988 Seoul Olympic 
was a significant cohort event that it was one of the first major global events that were 
hosted in ROK. Through the successful hosting of the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul, 
South Korea showcased its enhanced capability and level of development to the world. 
Also, it was an Olympic that both the communist and free-liberal bloc nations participated 
altogether.127 South Korea used this opportunity to boast its stability, development, and 
industrial achievements to visiting officials and foreigners. As a result, many eastern 
communist bloc nations established relations with South Korea after this event, which 
further isolated North Korea, as well as opening up the global market for South Korean 
manufactured goods.128  
Also, the proclamation of the “New Diplomacy” under President Kim Young-sam, 
South Korea created a new social environment by implementing government policies and 
educating citizens on segyehwa (globalization).129 Also, in 1989, the ROK government 
officially lifted the ban on foreign travel, which allowed many students to go abroad and 
experience other cultures. These new environments changed the young South Korean’s 
perspective on viewing the world from a parochial point-of-view to more international-
minded.130 The Democratic Generation became more aware of global issues like global 
peace and regional security, environmental protection, and international trade and 
development.  
b. Generational Characteristics 
Analyzing the historical events, the generational characteristics of the Democratic 
Generation can be identified as three major categories based on its unique experiences. 
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Table 5 shows the analyzed cohort effects caused by social environment and cohort 
experiences.  
Table 5. Generational Characteristics of the Democratic Generation   
Key Cohort 





  1987-1993 
(2) Ideological Superiority 
(2) Economic Superiority 






Peaceful Transition of Power 1987 (2) National Pride 
Seoul Summer Olympics 1988 (2) National Pride (1) Globalization/Liberalization 
Fall of Berlin Wall  1989 (1) End of the Cold War (2) Reunification 
Liberalization of Foreign Travel 1989 (1) Globalization/Liberalization 
Agreement on Reconciliation, 
Non-Aggression, and Exchanges 
and Cooperation 






  1993-1998 
 
(3) Liberalization (Reforms) 
(1) Civilian Government 
  Agreed Framework 1994 (2) Pro-North Korea (2) Anti-American 
Note: (1) through (3) indicate two categories of the generational characteristic 
 
The first category (1) of the generational characteristic of the Democratic 
Generation is its post-ideological mindset. The end of the Cold War brought the new 
chapter in world history. Broadly, this event put an end to ideological conflict and transition 
from bipolar power world order to a new unipolar power world order. Narrowly, this event 
created an ideological gap between South Korean generations, one who experienced the 
Cold War security environment, and one who has not. For the younger generation who has 
grown up in the post-Cold War security environment, politics of the black and white 
dichotomy is no longer valid and justified. Rather, individuality and pluralism were largely 
accepted from the new world view of globalization and liberalization. Also, from achieving 
rapid development, many South Koreans wanted to be a more responsible member of the 
56 
world community, especially transitioned from aid-receiving to aid-giving nation. 131 
Thus, the Democratic Generation shows more open and embracive perspectives to different 
ideas, including once tabooed socialism and truth about North Korea, while not hiding 
criticism towards the misdeeds of older generations. This tendency puts the Democratic 
Generation on the side of the progressive left, stands against the privileged class who 
established its power through abiding by the Cold War authoritarian order. 
The second category (2) of the Democratic Generation’s characteristic is its strong 
national pride from ROK’s improved situation. Entering the final decade of the millennium, 
South Korea became a rich democracy. By the mid-1990s, ROK achieved a total GDP of 
$500 billion, and GDP per capita of $10,000. 132  Another example of showing the 
development of South Korea and the emergence of consumeristic society is by counting 
the number of registered automobiles. As shown in Figure 5, the number of registered 
automobiles in Seoul remained low (less than 200,000) until the early 1980s but started to 
exponentially increase from 1985 (half million in 1985 to two million in 1995). 
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Figure 5. Number of Registered Automobiles in Seoul133 
Also, South Korea has a rank-conscious culture that people are constantly 
comparing their status and performance with those of the others.134 Thus, it was natural to 
develop a strong national pride as South Koreans learn about the situation in other parts of 
the world—not many nations can come par with the achievements of South Korea. From 
this nationalism, young South Koreans from the Democratic Generation demanded equal 
and fair status in the world. Also, they demanded independence from foreign pressure and 
interferences and developed hatred towards Japanese and Americans as they were imaged 
as the imperialistic invaders. 
 The third category (3) of the generational characteristic is the Democratic 
Generation’s interest in social problems from accelerated development, especially the 
treatment on losers of the economic system. Unlike previous generations, the main target 
of the student activists was not the regime or dictatorship. The main target was rising social 
inequality and unfairness. During industrialization, South Korean society had nourished a 
relatively egalitarian growth shared among all levels of society. However, by the late 1980s, 
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abusive power and social privileges of extremely wealthy class (chaebols) became the issue. 
It was seen as the division and solidification of new class structure based on region and 
family occupation, where the vertical social movement becomes less attainable as the social 
class became more as a hereditary determination. 135  People from the Democratic 
Generation became frustrated by this rising social issue, as they experienced noticeable 
glass ceilings and unfair treatment from the society as they entered the workforce in the 
1990s. Therefore, the Democratic Generation started to reject the social hierarchy and order 
that were created by the authoritarian generations. Also, this generation began to adopt 
“anti-authoritarianism,” which shares the same terminology as Transitional/386 
Generation’s generational characteristic, but it has a different meaning: it is not against the 
authoritarian regime itself, but all the systematic faults and social residue from the 
authoritarian order. In sum, the Democratic Generation seems to have more progressive 
tendencies than the Transition/386 Generation, as they are younger than 386-ers—less 
aging effect—and not as fortunate to nourish all the positive outcomes of earlier periods 
(i.e., equal growths, shared national interest with the United States, and less public division 
due to common enemy—North Korea).  
4. New Generation (Age: 20–39) 
The New Generation is the youngest political generation in South Korea, referring 
to the people currently in their 20s and 30s. They started experiencing their formative years 
(ages 15–25) in 1996, and the youngest members of this generation haven’t yet turned 25.  
There are many studies that further divide this generation into several different 
generational groups within, but this thesis uses a single generational classification to 
combine all young South Koreans born after 1981. This is because there is not yet a single 
impactful cohort experience that has happened after the IMF crisis of 1997, that politically 
(which affects one’s security perception) divides this group further. Asian Financial Crisis 
(AFC), more widely known as the IMF crisis to the Koreans, drastically changed the 
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perception and lifestyle of South Koreans.136 Although the national economy eventually 
recovered from the recession, the experience and reforms that the IMF crisis brought to 
Korean society left a long-lasting mark.  
South Koreans in the New Generation often blame the older generations for 
creating such a hard, unfair, unjust, and hopeless situation for them. They often refer to the 
current disillusioned society as a “Hell Joseon (헬조선).”137 These young South Koreans 
saw their parents got forcibly lose their jobs and business during the IMF crisis, families 
broken apart, and in some cases, lose lives. It was a destructive social event that they 
experienced during their formative years, and later impacting their life again as they 
became a working age. As grown-ups, they faced a slow economy with a high 
unemployment rate. Also, the New Generation saw the children of high-ranking officials 
and rich families, kids born with “the golden-spoon,” effortlessly took jobs and social status 
using their family background.138 It was social injustice and unfairness that this generation 
distressed the most, and it became the reason why they show more interest in politics, to 
fight the existing politics. 
Growing up in this unfavorable domestic environment, the people of the New 
Generation see North Korea as just another annoying neighboring country that makes their 
life no easier. They no longer see the North Koreans as families, and even feel less tied to 
than non-Korean ethnic foreign workers living in South Korea.139 Unlike the previous 
generations who felt the strong need for reunification, the New Generation is much less 
enthusiastic about it since they see more harm than good by pursuing it. Also, experiencing 
the era of reconciliation and peace talks held by the two consecutive progressive ROK 
administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moon-hyun, the New Generation saw that the 
North Korean regime had not changed a bit and it even built the nuclear weapon to solidify 
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its hostility towards South Korea. To the New Generation, North Korea is another example 
of an unjust, irrational, untrustworthy member of the society that these young South 
Koreans abhor the most from the domestic experience. Thus, unlike the Transition/386 and 
Democratic generations, the New Generation shares a negative perception towards North 
Korea.  
a. Historical Events and Unique Social Experiences 
(1) 1997 Asian Financial Crisis – The IMF Crisis 
Before the IMF crisis, South Korea enjoyed an unusually good economy and 
growth rate. From this high growth rate, the South Korean economy and consumer market 
were very promising and optimistic, which led companies to hire more workers to meet the 
market demand. Thus, the unemployment rate was kept low, and a low unemployment rate 
and high savings rate helped a relatively fair economic equality in South Korea. However, 
the economic decline during and after the IMF crisis brought many reforms that changed 
the South Korean society.  
One exemplary case of this reform is the workforce restructuring. Before the IMF 
crisis, South Koreans regarded their workplace as an “iron rice bowl,” which provides 
lifetime employment as well as a retirement pension. However, these social benefits were 
too costly to maintain for a long time, especially after the economic crisis. The original 
intention of the workforce reform was to make a more flexible workforce and nimble 
business environment, but it also created a social problem of irregular workers.140 Irregular 
workers, unlike traditional regular workers, are paid less and not guaranteed the four major 
insurances: health insurance, occupational hazard insurance, unemployment insurance, and 
the national pension, as well as no labor union protection.141 Businesses started to reduce 
the number of regular workers and filled the rest with irregular workers to gain flexibility 
and agility in the volatile economy. Unintentionally, this reform created a favorable 
condition for chaebols, providing them a dominant position, kap, to control its employees 
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using this new relationship between the business and workers. As the top 30 conglomerate 
groups (chaebols) in South Korea started controlled more than 40% of the ROK economy 
in the 2000s, the political and economic power they wield in the society became more 
powerful.142 In sum, the reforms based on the neo-liberalism has helped the South Korean 
economy to recover from the IMF crisis, but it also brought its structural limitation of rising 
inequality. 
(2) Strong Korea 
People in the New Generation, the 20s and 30s in the current South Korean society, 
have strong confidence and pride in ROK. From what they can remember, these young 
generations only saw that their nation as a strong and competitive nation, and it is no longer 
inferior compared to other world powers—such as the United States or Japan.143 They 
witnessed the successful performance of the national soccer team in the 2002 FIFA World 
Cup, which took place in South Korea, and the rise of global leading South Korean 
industries such as Samsung and Hyundai. Also, this generation’s confidence was highly 
raised as the young people successfully participated in a series of peaceful demonstrations, 
often referred to as the candlelight vigils, in 2002, 2004, and 2008. This version of public 
demonstration is largely different from the older generation’s version, where there was 
violence, Molotov cocktails, tear gas, yelling, and even casualties.144 Younger generations 
believe that South Korean society has now transitioned from a barbarous and immature 
society to a matured and fully democratized society where people can freely voice their 
opinions and concerns.145  
With this new identity of Strong Korea, the New Generation grew up with more 
sensitive feelings toward sovereignty and autonomy of its nation than previous generations. 
It was from inevitable identity change that came from the aforementioned economic 
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changes, but also from the domestic political change. After the Kim Young-sam 
administration, South Korea has elected its first progressive administration of Kim Dae-
jung, succeeded by another progressive government under Roh Moo-hyun. It was 10-years 
of the liberal progressive governments from 1998 to 2008. Behind this political change, 
there was an emergence of the Transition/386 Generation into the South Korean political 
domain. In their 30s and 40s, the progressive-minded 386-ers rose to the new political 
power. Under this new progressive wave of demanding autonomy, South Korea started to 
move away from the traditional patron-client relations with the United States, which had 
imposed heavy economic and diplomatic influence of the United States. As a capable and 
independent state, South Korea wanted to revise the relationship with the United States, 
demanding more respect for its autonomy and setting its own foreign policies.146  
The New Generation has grown up in the era of this relationship transition, which 
affected the young people’s perspective on the U.S.-ROK relations and the role of United 
States Forces in Korea (USFK). There were escalations of events in the early 2000s on the 
anti-Americanism in South Korea regarding the unfair terms of SOFA, such as a case of a 
U.S. soldier murdering South Korean citizen, contamination of USAF bombing range in 
Maehyang-ri, and USFK releasing formaldehyde into the Han river.147 Also, the Bush 
Administration’s hard stance against North Korea concerned many South Koreans about 
the possibility of the second Korean War.148 Finally, the public resentment on their unfair 
relation burst out in 2002 when U.S. Army truck struck and killed two schoolgirls in 
Korea—and the United States government refused the ROK’s request to conduct the trial 
of two U.S. soldiers on Korean court. This accident was publicized immediately after the 
2002 FIFA World Cup, and many passionate South Korean citizens came out to the same 
place where they cheered for their national team during the World Cup games to rally 
against the United States. The people from the New Generation have either participated in 
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this anti-American rally or seen it through the internet media, which made them think about 
whether they should continue or revise the current U.S.-ROK alliance relationship. 
The North Korea threat and provocations in the era of reconciliation were another 
notable experience of the New Generation. Through two consecutive progressive 
governments under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, ROK’s North Korean policy 
radically has shifted from the previous conservative regimes who utilized the containment 
strategy. This new engagement policy created the mood of reconciliation and peace talks. 
In non-government levels, inter-Korean personnel and trade exchange started to increase, 
Kaesong Industrial Complex was initiated, and many more humanitarian aids were 
provided to North Korea as part of this progressive policy. However, the reconciliatory 
policy created two negative impacts on the New Generation. First, despite the South’s 
good-will approach, the North continued its military provocations towards ROK and its 
nuclear programs. The New Generation had to face untrustworthy and irrational North 
Korea through the 2002 Battle of Yeon-pyeong, a series of missile and nuclear tests, and 
North Korean torpedo sinking the South Korean Navy warship, Cheon-an, in 2010.149 
Second, this engagement policy required a massive flow of money and resources from the 
South to the North, and South Korean citizens were not happy for being charged for these 
costs. The South Korean economy slowed down after the 1997 IMF crisis, and people were 
suffering from the effects of these financial hardships. On top of this, they were burdened 
with supporting North Koreans, especially solely trusting North Korea’s distribution 
system with very little to none transparency. As time goes, more and more younger 
generations became distrusting the idea of reconciliation with North Korea and turned 
hostile towards it.  
b. Generational Characteristics 
Analyzing the historical events, the generational characteristics of the New 
Generation can be identified as three major categories based on its unique experiences. 
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Table 6 shows the analyzed cohort effects caused by social environment and cohort 
experiences.  
Table 6. Generational Characteristics of the New Generation   
Key Cohort 
Environment Key Cohort Experience Event Year Cohort Effects 
  Lift Ban on Japanese Culture 1995 (2) Anti-Nationalism 
  Joining OECD 1996 (2) Status of Developed Nation 





  1998-2003 
(3) Progressive Government 
(3) Sunshine Policy 
(2) Autonomy 
  First Public High-Speed Internet Service 1999 
(1) (2) (3) Faster Information 
Sharing 
  Battle of Yeon-pyeong 2002 (3) Anti-North Korea 
  FIFA World Cup 2002 (2) Status of Developed Nation (Culture of Public Gathering 





  2003-2008 (2) Anti-American (2) Autonomy 
  First North Korean Nuclear Test 2006 (3) Anti-North Korea 





  2008-2013 
(1) Economic Inequality 
(3) Strengthen the U.S.-ROK 
alliance 
  Second North Korean Nuclear Test 2008 (3) Anti-North Korea 
  Global Financial Crisis 2008 (1) Economy Downfall 
  Cheon-an Sinking 2010 (3) Anti-North Korea 
Note: (1) through (3) indicate three categories of the generational characteristic 
 
The first category (1) of the generational characteristic of the New Generation is 
people’s discontent life in the “Hell-Joseon (Korea).” The term “Hell-Joseon” has quickly 
become the trend word that symbolizes the life of the young South Koreans in their 20s 
and 30s. The term is an amalgam of an English word, “Hell,” which emphasizes the 
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hopeless and miserable situation, and “Joseon,” which signifies a return of a traditional 
feudal society with the hereditary class structure.150 The “Hell-Joseon” can be explained 
in two ways: the emergence of a new class structure based on economic and political power, 
and people’s allergic reaction to the traditional mantras chanted by the older generations, 
such as “small individual sacrifice for the good of society as a whole” and “failure comes 
from lack of persevering effort.”151  
The issue of social class division started to noticed from the late 1980s. This issue 
has developed systematically from the ROK’s famous developmental state model of tight 
coordination between the business, chaebols, and government officials. To catch-up to the 
industrialized nations as a late starter, South Korea under authoritarian regimes widely used 
government intervention in the market to benefit and nurture its industries—in forms of 
subsidies, tax benefits, and bending the laws.152 Also, in order to concentrate the nation’s 
limited resources and capital, the ROK government deliberately picked winners and losers 
in the market competition.153 As time goes, this selection process became more corrupted, 
and particular chaebols and politicians were benefited from the system. This system created 
some families to be much more successful in South Korean society and became the upper-
class status with social privileges. 154  During the era of rapid development, even the 
common middle-class workers who worked for the chaebols could economically be 
benefitted from the growth. Through attaining higher education and getting accepted to 
top-level colleges could grant a chance to move up vertically.155 However, the 1997 IMF 
crisis has created a malicious effect on South Korean society by worsening the class 
division through an irregular worker system and unemployment. 
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The Gini coefficient for 1990–1995 was 0.258, which jumped to 0.307 in 2013.156 
Also, based on the 2015 ROK government report, irregular workers only got paid 
approximately half of what the regular workers were paid.157 This new social class based 
on economic inequality and economic power began to spread to all sectors of society, as it 
became the issue of “a golden-spoon” and “a dirt-spoon.” A satiric “euphemism for those 
born into wealth and power,” the golden-spoons had access to the privileges and easily rose 
to the position using the family background and wealth.158 However, the commoners, the 
dirt-spoons, had to shed blood, tear, and sweat to reach a glass ceiling, where only the 
privileged class can get access through that ceiling. This hopelessness of the young South 
Korean commoners in their 20s and 30s made them give-up their life events, such as a 
wedding, buying a house, and give birth. As a metric to see this phenomenon, the fertility 
level in South Korea recorded lowest in the world, reached 0.98 births per woman in 2018, 
which is much lower than the U.S. rate (1.72) and the Japanese rate (1.42).159 Thus, it is 
not surprising to see the high political participation of the young generation in South 
Korean politics, which is not a typical phenomenon in other liberal democratic nations. 
They are detesting social injustice and inequality and supporting policies that help to 
alleviate their hopeless situation. 
Also, with rigid glass ceilings formed in between classes, the New Generation 
began to adopt individualism—rejecting traditional mantra of “small individual sacrifice 
for the benefit of an entire society.” To the young South Koreans, the daily survival of one 
became the most imminent issue, and they do not have the luxury to look around others. 
Thus, the traditional values that the older generation often uses to scold the younger 
generation no longer affect positively. Similar reaction to perseverance and effort, the 
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young South Koreans believe that if one bears the hardship and put more effort, one will 
eventually collapse without achieving anything, but only be extracted by the kap, the 
people in dominant positions. In the end, the New Generation wants to reform the current 
demoralizing domestic situation, through fighting against the existing politics—both left 
and right—and finding the new alternatives. 
The second category (2) of the New Generation’s characteristic is its evolved notion 
of nationalism. From the War Generation, each South Korean generation had its unique 
style of nationalism. However, the New Generation’s nationalism is somewhat different 
from the previous characteristic of nationalism. First, the people from the New Generation 
want no outside influence on their government’s decision—they want full autonomy and 
protection of sovereignty. Yet, at the same time, they want to nourish everything that could 
provide benefits to them, including foreign culture, foreign manufactured goods, and 
foreign travel. Park Sun-Young named this evolved nationalism as the practical 
nationalism, which is created by pick and chooses, and mix-matching the characteristics of 
different nationalisms.160 This new type of nationalism often generates unpredictable 
results in public opinion. For one illustrated example, the New Generation could dislike 
President Trump and his foreign policies, but at the same time, they could like Starbucks 
coffee as their favorite coffee brand and want to visit New York City as a favorite travel 
destination. Another good example is the New Generation’s weaker animosity toward 
Japan and Japanese people. Although nearly all Koreans, including the New Generation, 
dislike Japan due to history and culture. However, the recent opinion poll shows that the 
New Generation started to see Japan and Japanese people differently than older South 
Koreans. As shown in Table 1 and Figure 6, there is a clear negative perception that South 
Koreans have toward Japan as a nation, with only a slight improvement by the New 
Generation. However, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 7, there is a clear generational 
difference in South Korean perception towards Japanese people.  
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Figure 6. South Korean Generational Perception of Japan, July 2019161 
 
Figure 7. South Korean Generational Perception of Japanese People, July 
2019162 
This confirms that the people from the New Generation do not find inconsistency 
by favoring one nation’s culture while condemning its foreign policy. This is because they 
have transitioned from a traditional nationalism that regards ethnic nation as a 
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predetermined identity to a practical nationalism that has much more gray zone in 
distinguishing one nation to another based on their needs. The young people in the New 
Generation make a distinction between specific things that they think important to have 
nationalistic sentiment and things that do not. For example, in the international competition 
or sports events, they become very nationalistic, and also when their nation is being 
persecuted unfairly, people get patriotic in their actions. However, when they are 
purchasing an imported item, young people tend to calculate the price value instead of 
where it originated, whereas some older generations simply boycott Japanese products 
altogether. 
The third category (3) of the New Generation’s characteristic is its conservatization 
in national security matters. As Manheim states, it is conventional wisdom that the people 
tend to be (or become) more conservative as they grow older. This is because people get 
additional social responsibilities and psychological resistance to change. However, unlike 
this conventional wisdom, the youngest generation in South Korean society, the New 
Generation, shows strong conservativism on the issue of national security. Their point of 
view is somewhat similar to those of the War Generation. Although the New Generation 
has different rationale from the War Generation for its conservative security perception, 
they both want stability based on a more traditional approach—achieving security with the 
United States against the common threat, North Korea. The New Generation’s special 
characteristic shows in two ways: its desire for the stronger U.S.-ROK alliance, and it’s 
intolerant on North Korea. 
Although the New Generation’s interest does not perfectly align with U.S. interests 
and foreign policy directions, based on the New Generation’s practical nationalism, young 
South Koreans want a firm security assurance from the strong U.S.-ROK alliance. They 
also want a cooperative U.S.-ROK relationship against other regional security matters 
while having enough space for ROK’s own diplomatic freedom. This trend can be 
confirmed through the 2017 Asan Institute’s research of the South Korean perspective on 
the United States compared to China. As a rising power, China became a very important 
partner to South Korea for regional security and economy. Especially, the younger 
generation has personally witnessed the rise of China in recent years. Yet, the people in 
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their 20s have shown the most pro-American tendency among all age-groups in the 
research.163 From all research categories (i.e., cultural influence, language preference, 
economic partnership, security cooperation), young South Korean showed a positive 
perspective towards the United States more than any other country.164 As such, even 
though they grew up seeing the anti-American rhetoric and protests, it did not leave a 
cohort-effect on the people of the New Generation. Rather, their practical nationalism 
brought their attitude closer to the United States, as they want stability among all other 
values. 
Also, people of the New Generation no longer want to tolerate any more on the 
North Korean threat and provocations. What they ultimately want is no more toleration of 
irresponsible North Korean actions. This strong opposition came from young South 
Koreans’ experience of series of North Korean provocations when they were in the age-
group for the mandatory military service. 165 For example, right after the incident of 
Cheon-an sinking in 2010, the number of volunteers to join the ROK Marines has spiked, 
reaching 3.5 to 1 volunteers to position ratio, which was unprecedented high.166 Base on 
the Joongang Daily interview, one of the young volunteer replied, “North Korea’s 
provocation provoked my challenge, I don’t want to avoid it,” and another volunteer replied, 
“I saw the servicemen of the same age die by the provocation of Cheon-an and 
Yeonpyeong-do, and I thought about North Korea’s reality once more.”167 To young South 
Koreans who live in Hell-Joseon, North Korean hereditary leader, Kim Jong-un, is another 
kid with a golden-spoon who is in the same age-group with the New Generation. Thus, to 
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young South Koreans, North Korea is the source of all the evil things that they are going 
through, and they want no more stress induced from the North as they are already getting 
too much stress in the first place.168 
5. Similarities and Differences among Generations 
Each of four South Korean generations has its unique generational characteristics, 
but at the same time, some characteristics are continued on from one generation to another. 
All generational characteristics discussed in this section are consolidated in Table 7.  
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Table 7. Characteristics of South Korea Generations   









Legacy of Authoritarian Regimes 
- Industrialization 
- Reconstruction 
- Controlled Society 
- Democratic Movement 
North Korea 
- Anti-North Korea 
United States 
- Pro-American 
- Strong Alliance 
Materialistic Survival 
- Growth Priority 
- Accepting Civil Liberty Restrictions 








- Alternative in Socialism 
Democratic Movement 
- Underground Organizations 
- Suppression/Violence 
- Anti-Military Regimes/Dictators 
- Winning Mentality 
North Korea 




- Room for Independent Diplomacy 
Economic Stability 
- Student Activism 
- Popular Culture/Consumerism 








- Civilian Government 
- No More Black/White Dichotomy 
Democratic Movement 
- Social Inequality and Unfairness 
- Anti-Authoritarianism 
North Korea 




- Room for Independent Diplomacy 
Economic Stability 
- Student Activism 
- Popular Culture/Consumerism 




- Practical Nationalism 




- Civilian Government 
- No More Black/White Dichotomy 
Hell-Joseon 
- Social Inequality and Unfairness 
- Anti-Authoritarianism 
- Hereditary Class Division 
- Golden Spoon/Dirt Spoon 
- Give-up 
North Korea 
- Anti-North Korea 
United States 
- Pro-American 
- Strong Alliance 
- Room for Independent Diplomacy 
Economic Struggle 
- Unemployment 
- Financial Crises 
- Glass Ceiling 
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B. POLITICAL IMPACT OF GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
So far, the historical events and its cohort effects on each South Korean generation 
are discussed. Using the generational characteristics that are identified through the cohort 
experience analysis, this section will explain how these generational characteristics have 
impacted ROK politics. First, each generation’s political relevance will be assessed. 
Second, each generation’s political tendencies will be related to the unique classification 
of the Left Progressives and the Right Conservatives in South Korean society. Altogether, 
the political impact of the generational differences will be analyzed through these two 
explanations. 
1. Political Relevance 
In order to measure the political relevance of each generation in the South Korean 
democratic society, the voting power of each generation and ROK presidential election 
results will be assessed. Voting power depicts how each generation is equally (or, fairly) 
represented in the society, in terms of its ability to make political impact according to the 
generation’s interest and policy preferences. The presidential election result provides the 
political tendency of each generation since ROK Presidential candidates clearly represent 
either progressive left and conservative right. Through analyzing the election results, this 
thesis will assess how consistent each generation vote for left or right, and any unusual 
results that represent the generational characteristics. 
a. Voting Power Calculation 
Table 8 and Table 9 illustrate the population makeup of each generation and voting 
rates in recent elections. Although the New Generation includes more people than other 
generational groups, its lower voting rate suggests that its political weight is no greater than 
that of older generations, (that is, when dealing with mass-level political patterns—as 
opposed to, say, elite-level policymaking, where younger generations are surely even less 
well represented). Therefore, each generation likely represents a roughly similar share of 
not only the ROK’s overall population but also of its politically influential population 
(again, depending on the type of influence in question).  
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Table 8. South Korean Population by Age-Groups and Generations169   
Age 
Group Born Year Generation Population 
Population 






Under Voting Age 
4224547 8.15% 
17.85% 
10-19 2000-2009 5029512 9.70% 




30-39 1980-1989 7156062 13.80% 
40-49 1970-1979 Democracy Generation 8407480 16.22% 16.22% 





22.23% 70-79 1940-1949 3559132 6.86% 
Older -1939 1830998 3.53% 
Total     51845612     
Note 1: Table reconstructed from ROK Ministry of Interior and Safety (MOIS) data. 
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Table 9. Voting Rates by South Korean Generations170 


























52.55% 76.00% 51.95% 
59.89% 
30-39 7156062 50.45% 74.20% 54.20% 
Democracy 
Generation 40-49 8407480 8407480 54.30% 74.90% 58.60% 62.60% 
Transition 





71.70% 84.10% 72.50% 
72.37% 70-79 3559132 73.30% 81.80% 74.50% 
Older 1830998 48.30% 56.20% 50.80% 
Total  42591553 42591553         
Note 1: Average Voting Rate calculated using population share and 2016–2018 voting rate data. 
 
b. Presidential Election Results 
Table 10 shows the past five presidential election results of South Korea. South 
Korea has a direct election system, which means the President will be elected by counting 
the total number of popular votes. Therefore, the voting power of each generation that was 
calculated above plays a significant role in analyzing the generational impact. 
Although the born-year does not perfectly align with proposed generational 
classification criteria, it provides a useful gauge on how each generation voted in the last 
five Presidential elections. Also, the age-group distinction is not intended to be a rigid 
unalterable line on time, but rather an overlapping and malleable range of time block. Thus, 
for the purpose of analyzing the presidential election trend, this method of generational 
labeling provides a relevant distinction between the generational groups. 
 
170 Adapted from Ministry of the Interior and Safety, “National Census Population Statistics (주민등록 
인구통계),” September 02, 2019, http://27.101.213.4/#; K-Indicator, “Voting Rate (선거 투표율),” June 27, 
2019, https://www.index.go.kr/unify/idx-info.do?idxCd=4268&clasCd=7. 
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Table 10. South Korean Presidential Election Voting Results by Age 
Groups171 
   Age-groups 
   20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 
15th (1997) 
  Calculated Born-year 1968-1977 1958-1967 1948-1957 1938-1947 Older-1937 
C Lee Hoi-chang 27.9% 34.8% 44.1% 51.0% - 
P Kim Dae-jung 43.2% 43.7% 37.2% 34.2% - 
16th (2002) 
  Calculated Born-year 1973-1982 1963-1972 1953-1962 1943-1952 Older-1942 
C Lee Hoi-chang 37.9% 34.2% 47.9% 57.9% 63.5% 
P Roh Moo-hyun 59.0% 59.3% 48.1% 40.1% 34.9% 
17th (2007) 
  Calculated Born-year 1978-1987 1968-1977 1958-1967 1948-1957 Older-1947 
C Lee Myung-bak 40.3% 39.7% 51.9% 60.9% - 
C Lee Hoi-chang 15.7% 15.8% 12.2% 12.3% - 
P Chung Dong-young 18.8% 27.7% 29.2% 23.5% - 
18th (2012) 
  Calculated Born-year 1983-1992 1973-1982 1963-1972 1953-1962 Older-1952 
C Park Geun-hye 32.5% 28.3% 43.4% 64.1% 74.7% 
P Moon Jae-in 66.7% 71.1% 56.4% 35.6% 25.2% 
19th (2017) 
  Calculated Born-year 1988-1997 1978-1987 1968-1977 1958-1967 Older-1957 
C Hong Jun-pyo 11.0% 9.0% 12.0% 26.0% 45.0% 
P Ahn Cheol-soo 15.0% 16.0% 18.0% 20.0% 26.0% 
P Moon Jae-in 46.0% 59.0% 55.0% 40.0% 23.0% 
  






Note 1: Table reconstructed from Gallup Korea Reports and MBC-HRC Exit Poll data. 
Note 2: 15th and 17th election result data use “50s and older” category. 
Note 3: “C” represent a conservative candidate; “P” represents a progressive candidate. 
 
Analyzing the presidential election voting results by age-groups, there are few 
conclusions can be made. First, the War Generation wholeheartedly support the 
 
171 Adapted from Gallup Korea, “Gallup Report,” January 1998, https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/
reportContent.asp?seqNo=151; Hye-kyung Park, “Analysis on 16th Presidential Election Result,” Polinews, 
December 21, 2002, http://www.polinews.co.kr/news/article.html?no=12269; Gallup Korea, “Gallup 
Report,” December 19, 2007, https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=169; Gallup 
Korea, “Gallup Report,” December 19, 2012, https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/
reportContent.asp?seqNo=373; Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20170509),” May 08, 2017, 
https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=830.  
77 
conservative candidate. For all five elections, the majority of people from the War 
Generation voted for conservative candidates. Especially, the War Generation voted Lee 
Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye at a very high rate (60.9% for Lee, 74.7% and 64.1% for 
Park). This distinguishing point can be explained as the War Generation’s leaning support 
for the legacies of authoritarian periods since President Lee was the successful ex-CEO of 
Hyundai Engineering and Construction during the industrialization era, and President Park 
is the daughter of their beloved leader, Park Chung-hee. 
Second, except for the 2007 Presidential Election, which was a landslide victory 
shifting from the 10-years of progressive governments, the majority of all other generations 
had voted the progressive candidates in these elections. The aging effect can be seen from 
the Transition/386 Generation, as they became more close-run once they became the 50s 
age-group (after the 17th Presidential Election). However, they still show slightly more 
leaning towards progressive candidates, which can be explained with the cohort effect on 
this generation. Also, the Democratic Generation shows the most progressive tendency in 
all elections. The cohort effect on this generation is very strong that many speculators 
believe that this generation will stay as left progressive even after they become the oldest 
generation. This is because the people from the Democratic Generation experienced both 
political struggles as they participated in student activism and social issues stemmed from 
inequality and injustice in ROK society. Synergistically, these two experiences provide the 
Democratic Generation a tendency to resolve social issues through active participation in 
politics, which drives them to lean more left against the privileged right.  
Third, regardless of a conservative perspective on national security matters, the 
New Generation is a strong supporter of the progressive candidates. However, no certain 
conclusion can be made yet because there is not much data to clearly see the trend. The 
New Generation’s support can be explained either as a personal attraction to President 
Moon Jae-in, or detestation of the privileged conservatives (authoritative older-
generations). Either way, the New Generation seems to value the left progressive identities 
and agenda at the same time, and it holds conflicting perceptions towards the U.S. and 
North Korea. 
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2. Left vs. Right 
In South Korea, there is a political spectrum that stretches from left progressives to 
right conservatives. This political spectrum holds many different social/political/economic 
issues, and these political issues are represented by numerous political parties and their 
supporters. However, unlike many other liberal democratic nations, South Korea has its 
unique classification of left versus right due to its political history and the geopolitical 
situation. Figure 8 shows some factors that differentiate the political identity in South 




Figure 8. South Korean Political Spectrum and Self-Identified Generational Political Identities172 
 
172 Adapted from Trend Monitor, “Assessment of Political Propensity and Perspective on National Issues in 2018,” Embrain Trend Monitor, June, 2018, 
https://trendmonitor.co.kr/tmweb/trend/allTrend/detail.do?bIdx=1689&code=0404&trendType=CKOREA.  
80 
Among many factors that differentiate the political identities in South Korea, the 
issue of “personal freedom” is one of the most important factors that divides left from right, 
and conservatives from progressives.173 This factor comes from the legacy of authoritarian 
military regimes. South Korean authoritarian regimes have used the suppression of civil 
rights and personal liberty to control society and political oppositions. The South Korean 
conservatives, who value the stability and growth, support this authoritarian style—even if 
it requires a small sacrifice of personal freedom. As an opposition, the South Korean 
progressives, who place their roots on the democratic protesters against the authoritarian 
social order, value personal freedom and civil liberty before anything. Contrary to the 
personal freedom factor, the majority of progressives and conservatives regard the issue of 
market freedom as secondary as they both agree that some level of government intervention 
is necessary to maintain its economic growth.174 
Regionalism is another factor that had a strong impact and still has a significant 
impact on the political identities of South Korean people. As shown in Figure 9, the 
presidential election results are showing a significant factional divide between west and 
east, especially between the Jeolla Province (Southwest) and the Gyeongsang Province 
(Southeast).  
 
173 Ipsos Public Korea, “Analysis on South Korean political identities,” Ipsos Issue Report 21, 
November 5, 2018, https://www.ipsos.com/ko-kr/ibsoseu-peobeullig-hangugin-jeongchiseonghyang-
josagyeolgwa-bunseog-hangug-gugmin-jasinui-jeongchi.  
174 Ipsos Public Korea, “Analysis on South Korean political identities.”  
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Figure 9. South Korean Presidential Election Results by Region175 
There are three explanations for this South Korean regionalism. The first is the 
historical explanation that this regional rivalry between Southwest and Southeast come 
from rivalries of ancient Korean kingdoms, Baekje and Silla.176 The second explanation 
comes from uneven economic development under the authoritarian military leaders, from 
Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, and Roh Tae-woo. As all three presidents came from 
the Southeast region, they developed Southeast into a major industrial hub with a lot of 
investment in infrastructures while Southwest was left as a poor agricultural region.177 The 
third explanation is the political rivalry between Southeast-supported candidates and Kim 
Dae-jung, who came from the Southwest region.178 Kim Dae-jung had run continuously 
against the conservative presidential candidates from Southeast, Park Chung-hee, Roh Tae-
woo, and Kim Young-sam. He finally won and became South Korea’s first progressive 
president in 1997. Throughout his life, he was the most important political symbol of the 
Jeolla region, and he is still remembered as a “Respected Teacher” in the Jeolla Province. 
 




176 Se-Woong Koo, “The Potent Force of S Korea’s Regionalism,” Korea Expose, April 27, 2017, 
https://www.koreaexpose.com/potent-force-koreas-regionalism/. 
177 Se-Woong Koo, “The Potent Force of S Korea’s Regionalism.” 
178 Se-Woong Koo, “The Potent Force of S Korea’s Regionalism.”  
82 
As such, there is a long historical background to South Korea’s regionalism, and 
traditionally, South Koreans voters have “not deviated much from their respective 
tendencies.”179 There is a new trend that shows the breakdown of this regionalism factor 
as the generation gets younger since younger South Koreans have not personally 
experienced the regional rivalries. Yet, the significance of regional background and its 
associated identity might continue on for the future.  
Also, another critical factor that differentiates political left from the right is the 
stance towards North Korea. Ideologically speaking, Korean War already divided right-
wing (free democracy) in the South and left-wing (communism) in the North. As two 
countries are still fighting this ideological war, it is hard to live as an ideological left in 
South Korea—as right belligerently criticize left as being “commies.” 180 Therefore, the 
left progressives who are softer and embracive toward North Korea was an easy target 
during the military authoritarian period. It was not until the progressive 10-years under 
Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, that this left progressives publicly solidified their 
posture toward North Korea.181 On the contrary, the people who have a more hardline 
stance toward North Korea, who express anti-communist and more aggressive absorptive 
unification policy, often classify themselves as right conservatives. 182  This political 
factionalism based on North Korean policy creates a unique mixture of terminologies in 
South Korea. The term left (좌파), and progressive (진보) often used as one word with similar 
meaning, especially for the older generations who tend to see the new-order seeking 
revolutionaries as all commies.183 However, this separation of terminology becomes more 
clear to the younger generation, who sees less convincing that labeling progressive and 
moderate policies as communism.184 
 
179 Se-Woong Koo, “The Potent Force of S Korea’s Regionalism.” 
180 Haeryun Kang and Ben Jackson, “What ‘Progressive’ Means in South Korea,” Korea Expose, 
March 22, 2017, https://www.koreaexpose.com/progressive-meaning-south-korea/. 
181 Haeryun Kang and Ben Jackson, “What ‘Progressive’ Means in South Korea.” 
182 Haeryun Kang and Ben Jackson, “What ‘Progressive’ Means in South Korea.” 
183 Haeryun Kang and Ben Jackson, “What ‘Progressive’ Means in South Korea.” 
184 Haeryun Kang and Ben Jackson, “What ‘Progressive’ Means in South Korea.” 
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As such, the factors that affect the division of political identity in South Korea 
sprouted from the historical experience, and these historical experiences also have affected 
the generational characteristics of each South Korean generation. Therefore, there is a 
relevant correlation between the generational identity and the political identity in South 
Korea (i.e., the War Generation at the right end of the political spectrum and the 
Democratic Generation at another end of the spectrum, with the Transition/386 Generation 
and the New Generation in between). However, the over-generalization of the political 
tendencies with a specific generation should be avoided since different political views can 
coexist within a generation. One exemplary case is the rise of the New-Right (뉴라이트) 
faction within the traditionally-left Transition/386 Generation. They are the people who 
transitioned from the progressive faction, who used to fight against authoritarianism, to the 
conservative faction as they were later found disagreement with progressive values and 
attracted by the neoliberal economy.185 These new conservatives within the Transition/
386 Generation played a big role in policymaking during President Lee Myung-bak and 
President Park Geun-hye.186 
C. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the analysis has confirmed the significance of the cohort effect on 
the South Korean generational characteristics. Each of four South Korean generations has 
developed its unique propensity and identity from the cohort experiences of its youth years 
on social/political/economic issues, which affects their views on North Korea, the United 
States, and South Korean autonomy.  
Also, these different generational characteristics impact the South Korean politics. 
South Korea’s unique geopolitical environment and historical experiences have created a 
special classification method of political left versus right and the progressive versus the 
conservative. This political spectrum is organized based on diverging perspectives on 
authoritarianism, personal freedom, regional background, and stance toward North Korea. 
 
185 Jae-Heung Park, Generational Difference and Conflict: Theory and Reality, 78. 
186 Jae-Heung Park, Generational Difference and Conflict: Theory and Reality, 78. 
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Since these issues with diverging perspectives stem from the similar historical experiences 
that distinguish the generational characteristics of the four South Korean generations, the 
correlation between the political propensity and generational characteristics of each 
generation is confirmed. South Korean is a liberal democracy, and popular perception can 
make a difference in political decisions. Thus, generational political propensity can 
influence the South Korean policy decisions on the matters of national security and the 
future of the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
Therefore, the public opinion poll will be analyzed to investigate the South Korean 
perspectives on the national security and the U.S.-ROK alliance in the next chapter, 
focusing on the three issues: 1) perceptions of North Korea, 2) perceptions of the United 
States and U.S. forces in Korea, and 3) perceptions of ROK national autonomy. For 
individual issues, regional background, generation, and self-identified political identity of 
poll respondents will be taken into a comprehensive assessment to confirm the significant 
difference and distinction among South Korean generations on national security issues. 
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III. GENERATIONAL IMPACTS ON U.S.-ROK SECURITY 
ALLIANCE 
In this chapter, the South Korean generational influence on three national security 
matters will be analyzed. The three national security matters are South Korean perceptions 
on North Korea, the United States, and ROK national autonomy. On each South Korean 
national security matters, public opinion poll data will be used to assess how each 
generation thinks differently on the issues that are related to the national security. This 
thesis did not design or conducted public opinion polls but carefully selected existing 
polling data from the professional polling agencies. There are some limitations to directly 
utilize the collected dataset, so some data are reconstructed for better fitting in the data 
analysis. Every alteration of the original data is noted in the data presented. 
To capture the effect of current events and increase the relevancy of the dataset, 
only the recent opinion polls (polls conducted after 2018) were used. Also, using a more 
recent dataset helps to minimize the conversion error while in the converting age-group 
(e.g., 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s) to four generations (e.g., New Generation, Democratic 
Generation, Transition/386 Generation, War Generation). For example, people in their 20s 
and 30s in 2019 were born between 1980 to 1999, which largely overlap with the year-
groups of the New Generation (1981-2000). However, this meaningful overlap of the age-
group and the generational classification starts to deviate when the older data is used. Thus, 
only the recent poll data (2018-2019) are used in this analysis.  
Overall, the data analysis in this Chapter has confirmed the difference in 
generational tendencies in each national security matters. Through analyzing the trend on 
specific issues within each national security factor (North Korea, the United States, ability 
to self-defense), this chapter concludes that there are noticeable, consistent, and 
academically significant differences among South Korean generations on the issues of 
ROK national security. 
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A. GENERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON NORTH KOREA  
The issue regarding North Korea is a key factor in understanding the South Korean 
national security situation. Ever since the division of the nation, North Korea and South 
Korea have been the biggest security threat to each other and continue to point their guns 
at each other until this day. Also, as discussed in Chapter II, the South Korean perception 
towards North Korea is one of the most distinctive factors that bisects the political identity 
in ROK.  
The expected generational tendencies can be drawn from the cohort-experience 
analysis conducted in Chapter II (refer to Table 7 for the detailed generational 
characteristics). The youngest New Generation and oldest War Generation are expected to 
have a negative perception towards North Korea, while the Democratic Generation and the 
Transition/386 Generation are expected to have a more positive perception towards North 
Korea. Thus, this section will assess how these expected South Korean generational 
tendencies are expressed in the opinion poll data. 
1. Perception of Current North Korean Leader, Kim Jong-un 
The first opinion poll was selected to see how each South Korean generation 
perceives differently on the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un. The poll question asked 
was: How do you feel about DPRK leader, Kim Jong-un? The opinion poll result is shown 
in Table 11.  
The poll was conducted during May 2018. Leading up to this time, there was a 
peaceful atmosphere developed in inter-Korean relations. President Moon Jae-in and 
Chairman Kim Jong-un had their second high-level summit meeting at Panmunjom on May 
26, 2018. Also, President Trump sent a positive message to Chairman Kim, and two leaders 
were preparing for the Singapore Summit, which happened later in June 2018. Therefore, 
there could be a slight leaning of South Korean public opinion towards a more favorable 
perception. Also, based on the historical analysis from Chapter II, the South Korean 
progressives are expected to show a more favorable stance towards North Korea and higher 
trust towards North Korean leaders.  
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Table 11. South Korean Perception of Kim Jong-un (May 2018)187 
    Sample Size Favorable Not Favorable No answer 
Total 1000 31% 55% 14% 
Region Seoul 195 29% 56% 15% 
Gyeong-gi 301 34% 55% 12% 
Gangwon 30 - - - 
Chung-cheong 105 31% 56% 13% 
Jeolla 100 43% 38% 19% 
Gyeong-buk 101 23% 58% 18% 
Gyeong-nam 155 29% 62% 9% 
Jeju 12 - - - 
Generation New 346 21% 69% 10% 
Democratic 202 40% 46% 13% 
Transition 200 43% 48% 9% 
War 251 28% 50% 22% 
Political Identity Conservative 182 20% 69% 10% 
Center-middle 274 28% 60% 12% 
Progressive 366 44% 45% 10% 
None 178 20% 54% 26% 
Note 1: Table reconstructed from Gallup Korea data, the original data shows age-group as 
decades (30s, 40s, etc). 
Note 2: The original data has not given statistics for sample size smaller than 50. 
 
The result shows a noticeable pattern among each criterion and follows the 
expected tendencies. Among regions, Jeolla province, the most left-progressive province 
in South Korea, specifically showed a more favorable stance (43% favorable/38% non-
favorable) than other provinces (23-34% favorable/55-62% non-favorable). Among 
generations, the Democratic and Transition/386 generations showed near double the 
favorable stance (40-43%-favorable) than the New and War generations (21-28%-
favorable). Self-identified political identities also followed the expected results as well: a 
 
187 Adapted from Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20180531),” May 2018, https://www.gallup.co.kr/
gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=931.  
88 
more favorable perception from the progressives and a more non-favorable perception from 
the conservatives and center-middles. 
2. Perception of North Korean Regime 
The next opinion poll is asking a similar question to the first opinion poll, but this 
poll was specifically selected to see how each South Korean generation perceives 
differently on Kim Jong-un and North Korean ruling class. The poll question asked was: 
How do you feel about the North Korean regime and ruling powers?  
The poll was conducted during August 2018 as a part of research on Korean 
reunification. There was a continued mood of reconciliation as Chairman Kim Jong-un had 
used a top-down method to express his will to negotiate for peace and denuclearization. 
However, there was a speculation from South Korean news media that Kim Jong-un had 
to face a domestic political resistance when he met with President Trump to discuss 
denuclearization and peace treaty—especially from the North Korean military.188 Thus, 
Kim Jong-un and North Korean political elites should be seen as separate entities in the 
discussion of bringing peace in the Korean peninsula, as these two parties’ interests might 
not be the same in that regard. Unlike the first opinion poll, this poll asked about the North 
Korean regime and its ruling political power as a whole, so the results should reflect the 
different feelings that South Koreans have towards Kim and North Korean political elites. 
The opinion poll result is shown in Table 12. 
  
 




Table 12. South Korean Perception of North Korean Regime (August 
2018)189  
    Sample Size Favorable Neutral 
Not 
Favorable 
Total 1000 20.6% 43.9% 35.4% 
Region Seoul 194 18.9% 45.4% 35.7% 
Gyeong-gi 303 20.3% 43.1% 36.5% 
Gangwon 29 20.7% 48.3% 31.0% 
Chung-cheong 106 25.6% 39.2% 35.2% 
Jeolla 102 22.9% 53.2% 23.9% 
Gyeong-buk 102 13.1% 45.7% 41.2% 
Gyeong-nam 153 21.5% 40.7% 37.8% 
Jeju 11 45.5% 18.2% 36.4% 
Generation New 333 13.0% 48.7% 38.4% 
Democratic 202 24.7% 48.9% 26.4% 
Transition 205 28.9% 38.6% 32.5% 
War 260 16.9% 38.2% 41.2% 
Political Identity Conservative - -  -  -   
Center-middle - -  -  - 
  Progressive - -  -  -  
Note 1: Table reconstructed from KBS data, the original data shows age-group as decades (30s, 
40s, etc). 
Note 2: The original data has not given statistics for political identity. 
 
Overall, the result follows the same pattern from the first opinion poll that asked 
about the perception of Kim Jong-un. It shows the biggest favorability difference between 
Jeolla and Gyeong-buk provinces, and the result shows more negative perception from the 
New and War generations and a more positive perception from the Democratic and 
Transition/386 generations. Unlike the original speculation, the data pattern does not show 
a relevant deviation from the pattern of the first opinion poll. The South Korean people 
perceive similarly on both Kim Jong-un and North Korea’s ruling powers. One difference 
 





compared to the first poll was that this poll had a large number of people who answered 
neutral, or not-bad (그저그렇다), but this does not alter the trend pattern. Thus, we can 
conclude that this opinion poll also follows generational tendencies based on their cohort 
experience and characteristics. 
3. Perception of Economic Aids to North Korea  
The next opinion poll was selected to see how each South Korean generation 
perceives differently on the aids that are sent to North Korea. The poll question asked was: 
Which do you agree? 1) If North Korea decides not to abandon its nuclear program, South 
Korea should cease all aids to North Korea, or 2) Even if North Korea decides not to 
abandon its nuclear program, South Korea should continue the humanitarian aids to North 
Korea.  
The poll was conducted during May 2019. One week prior to this poll was taken, 
the Executive Board President of the UN World Food Program (UNWFP) visited South 
Korea and met with ROK government officials to discuss the famine issue in North Korea. 
The official UNWFP report suggests partner nations’ humanitarian relief donation to North 
Korea to support 11 million undernourished people.190 However, this humanitarian aid 
issue created friction within the U.S.-ROK relations as the United States wanted to continue 
the full-pressure economic sanctions to coerce North Korea to come to the negotiation table. 
Also, between May 4 and 9, North Korea tested dozens of missiles over the East Sea (Sea 
of Japan). This broke the 522 days without a North Korean missile test. This resumption 
of North Korean hostile action happened two months after the failed Hanoi summit, and 
just a few days after the U.S.-ROK alliance announcement of its plan for a new joint 
military exercise, Dong-maeng.191 Therefore, public opinion could have mixed feelings in 
this complex environment. Potentially, the progressive generations could focus more on 
“we are all one family” ethnic nationalism and support the humanitarian aids, whereas the 
 
190 World Food Program, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” United Nations, accessed 
January 27, 2020, https://www.wfp.org/countries/democratic-peoples-republic-korea. 
191 Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, “Why North Korea Is Testing Missiles Again,” Foreign Affairs, 
May 16, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2019-05-16/why-north-korea-testing-
missiles-again.  
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conservative generations could focus more on military provocation and uncooperativeness 
of the North Korean regime and unsupportive on the humanitarian aids. The opinion poll 
result is shown in Table 13. 
Table 13. South Korean Perception of Economic Aids to North Korea (May 
2019)192  




humanitarian aids No answer 
Total 1000 54% 38% 8% 
Region Seoul 194 56% 36% 8% 
Gyeong-gi 305 48% 43% 9% 
Gangwon 30 - - - 
Chung-cheong 105 60% 35% 5% 
Jeolla 99 44% 46% 10% 
Gyeong-buk 100 69% 23% 8% 
Gyeong-nam 154 57% 38% 5% 
Jeju 13 - - - 
Generation New 341 58% 37% 6% 
Democratic 197 42% 52% 6% 
Transition 199 50% 42% 8% 
War 263 61% 27% 12% 
Political 
Identity 
Conservative 211 69% 26% 5% 
Center-middle 343 59% 36% 5% 
Progressive 267 34% 61% 5% 
None 180 56% 24% 20% 
Note 1: Table reconstructed from Gallup Korea data, the original data shows age-group as 
decades (30s, 40s, etc). 
Note 2: The original data has not given statistics for sample size smaller than 50. 
 
The result shows a noticeable pattern among each criterion and follows the 
expected tendencies. Overall, more than half of the ROK public wants to cease all 
humanitarian aids if North Korea continues its military provocations. Also, a consistent 
 
192 Adapted from Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20190516),” May 2019, https://www.gallup.co.kr/
gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1013.  
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trend is showing in the result that left-progressives (Jeolla region, Democratic and 
Transition/386 generations, self-identified progressives) are in support for humanitarian 
aids, whereas the right-conservatives (Gyeong-buk region, New and War generations, self-
identified conservatives) are in support for maintaining the hardline sanction against the 
North Korean regime. 
4. Perception of North Korean Credibility  
The last opinion poll is about the South Korean perception of North Korean 
credibility—how much it can be trusted. For this opinion poll, this thesis took two polls 
that asked the same question from different time periods. One poll was conducted in May 
2018, and another was conducted in October 2019. The question that both polls asked was: 
do you believe that North Korea will keep its promises such as Denuclearization, 
Declaration of Peace, and the Peace Treaty?  
Two opinion polls were captured in the analysis to verify that generational 
tendencies do not get affected by the atmosphere changes. For example, on the one hand, 
May 2018 poll represents one of the most benign perspectives of South Koreans towards 
North Korea. Leading up to this time, series of top-level summits were conducted between 
the South and the North, and President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un signed the 
“Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity, and Unification of the Korean Peninsula” 
on April 27, 2018.193 On the other hand, October 2019 poll represents one of the most 
hostile perspectives of South Koreans towards North Korea. Beginning in May 2019, North 
Korea resumed its missile test program as a response to ongoing economic sanctions on 
North Korea. South Korean public saw North Korea violating the Panmunjom Declaration 
by resuming hostile actions. Also, North Korea tested submarine-launched ballistic missile 
(SLBM) the day after it has agreed to resume nuclear talks, and the actual talk in Stockholm 
fell apart just in one day as North Korean delegations walked out from the room blaming 
 
193 Patrick Monaghan, “Don’t Forget About the Panmunjom Declaration,” The Diplomat, May 30, 
2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/dont-forget-about-the-panmunjom-declaration/.  
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the United States.194 From these series of events, the South Korean public grew upset 
towards North Korea’s irresponsible actions and became intolerant to its malicious-
intended behaviors. The opinion poll results are shown in Table 14, and the data reflects 
different general public attitudes towards North Korea between May 2018 and October 
2019 timeframes. 



















    Sample Size NK will keep its promise 
NK will not keep the 
promise No answer 
Total 1002 1002 49% 21% 30% 64% 21% 14% 
Region Seoul 200 193 44% 21% 35% 68% 21% 11% 
Gyeong-gi 295 308 56% 20% 29% 66% 16% 13% 
Gangwon 30 30 - - - - - - 
Chung-
cheong 103 104 45% 18% 28% 66% 26% 17% 
Jeolla 99 99 67% 36% 17% 38% 17% 26% 
Gyeong-buk 99 100 34% 16% 33% 74% 34% 10% 
Gyeong-nam 162 156 42% 20% 36% 66% 22% 15% 
Jeju 14 12 - - - - - - 
Generation New 330 291 52% 26% 32% 61% 18% 12% 
Democratic 206 213 59% 31% 24% 58% 17% 11% 
Transition 210 211 51% 20% 31% 65% 18% 15% 
War 256 268 35% 9% 33% 72% 32% 18% 
Political 
Identity Conservative 187 273 26% 8% 57% 87% 17% 5%  
Center-
middle 272 303 47% 20% 35% 66% 19% 13% 
  Progressive 366 274 69% 41% 15% 44% 15% 15% 
Note 1: Table reconstructed from Gallup Korea data, the original data shows age-group as 
decades (30s, 40s, etc). 
Note 2: The original data has not given statistics for sample size smaller than 50. 
 
194 Jung Pak, “Why North Korea walked away from negotiations in Sweden,” Brookings, October 18, 
2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/10/18/why-north-korea-walked-away-from-
negotiations-in-sweden/.  
195 Adapted from Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20180531),” May 2018, https://www.gallup.co.kr/
gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=931; Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20191010),” October 2019, 
https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1051. 
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The result shows a noticeable pattern among each criterion and follows the 
expected tendencies. Regardless of the timeframe, a consistent trend is showing in the 
result that left-progressives (Jeolla region, Democratic and Transition/386 generations, 
self-identified progressives) are more trusting North Korea will keep its promises, whereas 
the right-conservatives (Gyeong-buk region, New and War generations, self-identified 
conservatives) do not trust North Korea. Generationally, the trend lines show similar 
shapes, which means that regardless of the public atmosphere, each generation has 
structured tendencies that it follows. As shown in Figure 10, the trend line looks almost 
identical except that of its position on the y-axis. Thus, there is a generational difference in 
the South Korean perception of North Korean credibility, and the generational response 
follows a similar pattern from poll results on the other North Korea-related issues. 
 
Figure 10. South Korean Opinion Poll Results on North Korean Credibility, 
Reproduced from May 2018 and October 2019 Data196 
5. Trend Analysis of Generational Perspectives—North Korean Issues 
There are some common features that we confirmed from the opinion poll analysis 
over the South Korean generational perception of North Korea-related issues. First, all four 
public opinion poll graphs depict a very similar pattern of a trend line. According to the 
 
196 Adapted from Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20180531);” Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion 
(20191010).” 
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shape of trend lines shown in Figure 11, the lines have a set of bell-shaped curves with the 
two ends diverging outward in opposite directions.  
 
Figure 11. Generational Perspective on All Four North Korean Issues, Graphs 
Represent Opinion Poll Data from Table 11 through Table 14197 
This bell-shape represents that the youngest and oldest generations (New and War 
generations) behave more antagonistic against North Korea, whereas the center generations 
(Democratic and Transition/386 generations) have a more cooperative position towards 
North Korea. This follows the expected tendencies of South Korean generations as the 
generational characteristics defined using the cohort experience analysis (refer to Table 7). 
Between the two pro-North Korean generations, the Democratic Generation seems to have 
more hopeful trust towards North Korea as poll results showed on the issues of 
humanitarian aids and credibility. Based on their cohort experience of post-Cold War peace, 
people from the Democratic Generation believe that North Korea will soon open their 
 
197 Adapted from Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20180531);” Korean Broadcasting System, “2018 
South Korean Reunification Survey; Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20190516);” Gallup Korea, “Daily 
Opinion (20180531);” Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20191010).” 
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borders and start the economic/political reforms towards Korean reconciliation. However, 
unlike the Democratic Generation, the Transition/386 Generation has experienced the 
ideological fight and hostile times. Therefore, although the Transition/386 Generation 
shows the highest favorability rate towards the North Korean regime based on its cohort 
characteristics, it holds a more realistic (and somewhat pessimistic) perspective on 
peacefully resolving the inter-Korean issues that are both long-lasting and intricate. 
B. GENERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON US–ROK ALLIANCE 
The U.S.-ROK alliance is a key military institution that holds the U.S.-ROK 
relationship integrated even under some disputes and disagreements. Regardless of 
political interpretation, the presence of the USFK in South Korea ensured the domestic 
stability and prevented another Korean War. Even though the times of reforms and 
situational changes, the U.S.-ROK alliance remained as one of the key factors to 
understand the South Korean national security situation. Furthermore, the unique cohort 
experiences of the South Korean population have developed divergent perspectives on the 
United States and the roles and responsibilities of the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
The expected generational tendencies can be drawn from the cohort-experience 
analysis conducted in Chapter II. In a quick review, the generational characteristics and 
tendencies on the U.S.-ROK alliance are inversely related to generational perceptions on 
the North Korean issues. The youngest New Generation and oldest War Generation are 
expected to have a positive perception towards the United States and its role on ROK 
national security, whereas the Democratic Generation and the Transition/386 Generation 
are expected to have a more negative perception towards the United States and the U.S.-
ROK alliance. Thus, this section will assess how the expected South Korean generational 
tendencies are expressed in the opinion poll data and whether there is a discrepancy 
between expected tendencies and the poll outcome. 
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1. Perception of USFK Credibility 
The first opinion poll is about whether the South Korean population is trusting the 
USFK for the ROK’s national security. The poll question asked was: Do you trust the U.S. 
Forces in Korea? The opinion poll result is shown in Table 15.  
Table 15. South Korean Perception of USFK Credibility (January 2019)198 
    Sample Size Trust Distrust 
Total 1000 62.5% 34.4% 
Region Seoul - - - 
Gyeong-gi - - - 
Gangwon - - - 
Chung-cheong - - - 
Jeolla - - - 
Gyeong-buk - - - 
Gyeong-nam - - - 
Jeju - - - 
Generation New - 62.2% 35.2% 
Democratic - 55.9% 42.8% 
Transition - 62.2% 34.7% 
War - 68.1% 26.6% 
Political Identity Conservative - 81.3% 16.5% 
Center-middle - 57.4% 39.3% 
Progressive - 56.2% 42.7% 
Note 1: Table reconstructed from Asan Institute data, the original data shows age-group as 
decades (30s, 40s, etc). 
Note 2: The original data has not given statistics for the categorized sample size and region. 
 
 
198 Adapted from James Kim, Choong-gu Kang, Yumi Ko, Scott Snyder, and Ellen Swicord, “South 






The poll was conducted in January 2019 as a part of the Asan Institute’s 
comprehensive assessment of the U.S.-ROK alliance and USFK. Before this poll was 
conducted, there were two events that happened that could have a potentially negative 
impact on South Korean perception of the U.S.-ROK relations. First, the military tension 
was reduced between North Korea and South Korea due to Panmunjom Declaration and 
Moon Administration’s effort to create a peaceful atmosphere. Since deterrence of North 
Korean threat is the raison d’être for the U.S.-ROK alliance, the easement of tension 
between two Koreas could raise questions for the necessity of the U.S. forces in Korea. 
Second, the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) negotiation for defense burden-sharing 
became the hot issue as the Trump Administration requested a dramatic increase in share 
cost to ROK.199 Although the SMA was signed in February 2019, this left much South 
Korean public outraged on the U.S. demand and made many South Koreans concern about 
the U.S. commitment toward the 66-year old alliance. Thus, the following poll results could 
potentially show the effects of this recent friction in the relationship between the United 
States and South Korea. 
However, even with the negative image of USFK and the United States, the opinion 
poll results show that 62.5% of South Korean respondents are trusting the United States 
troops in Korea. Even the most anti-American generation, the Democratic Generation, and 
the self-identified progressives answered favorably towards the USFK (more than half of 
the respondents in these groups are trusting USFK). The Transition/386 Generation is not 
as confrontational as expected (results are similar to those of the New Generation), and the 
New and War generations show strong support to the U.S. troops as expected based on the 
cohort analysis.  
2. Perception of U.S. Forces Stationing in Korea 
The next opinion poll was taken from the same Asan Institute study with the first 
poll. The intention of this question is slightly different from the previous question. The 
 
199 Kyle Ferrier, “The US-South Korea Military Cost-Sharing Agreement Has Expired. Now What?,” 
The Diplomat, January 4, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/the-us-south-korea-military-cost-sharing-
agreement-has-expired-now-what/.  
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previous question was asking how South Koreans feel about the U.S forces, but this 
question is about South Korean perception of the physical presence of the U.S. military in 
the Korean peninsula. A physical presence of foreign military force is a sensitive issue, 
both politically and national autonomy, especially in Korea that has a history of multiple 
foreign interruptions and imperialistic occupation. However, at the same time, the South 
Korean population believes its “blood-tied alliance” with the United States, and people 
trust the USFK to protect them from the regional security threats. Thus, this opinion poll 
will shed light on South Korean perception of U.S. forces stationing in Korea. The poll 
question asked is: How do you feel about the continued U.S. military station in Korea? The 
result shows in Table 16. 
Table 16. South Korean Perception of U.S. Military Stationing in Korea 
(January 2019)200  
  Sample Size Approve Disapprove 
Total 1000 67.7% 29.8% 
Region Seoul - - - 
Gyeong-gi - - - 
Gangwon - - - 
Chung-cheong - - - 
Jeolla - - - 
Gyeong-buk - - - 
Gyeong-nam - - - 
Jeju - - - 
Generation New - 64.1% 33.2%  
Democratic - 62.1% 37.9%  
Transition - 63.3% 33.7%  
War - 79.6% 17.1% 
Political Identity Conservative - 82.8% 16.4% 
Center-middle - 68.3% 29.5% 
Progressive - 55.6% 42.9% 
Note 1: Table reconstructed from Asan Institute data, the original data shows age-group as 
decades (30s, 40s, etc) and by gender. 
Note 2: The original data has not given statistics for the categorized sample size and region. 
 
200 Adapted from James Kim, Choong-gu Kang, Yumi Ko, Scott Snyder, and Ellen Swicord, “South 
Korean Perception of the US–ROK alliance and USFK.” 
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The result in Table 16 shows distinct generational differences and follows overall 
similar generational characteristics. The oldest War Generation was expected to show a 
strong approval rate of continued U.S. military presence in Korea since these older people 
were the ones who directly witnessed the U.S. military fought for South Korea against the 
communist invasion. After the War Generation, the cohort analysis suggests that weaker 
support for U.S. military presence from the younger generations. However, each of the 
younger generations (Transition/386, Democratic, New) has different motives behind its 
weaker support. The motive of Transition/386 Generation comes from its supportive 
tendency towards North Korea, whereas the Democratic Generation from its anti-American 
sentiment and the New Generation from its self-confidence that South Korea is strong 
enough to protect itself. Compared to the first poll results about the credibility, Figure 12 
illustrates the generational difference shown from the two questions about South Korean 
perception towards USFK. 
 
Figure 12. Comparison of Poll Results Between USFK Credibility and South 
Korean Support for Continued USFK Station in Korea201 
 
201 Adapted from James Kim, Choong-gu Kang, Yumi Ko, Scott Snyder, and Ellen Swicord, “South 
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Overall, all four South Korean generations acknowledge the necessity of the U.S. 
military presence in South Korea. The poll results show a higher approval rate for 
continued USFK station than the USFK credibility rate in all four generations. The shapes 
of trend lines look similar to each other, with some amplitude variation shown from the 
War Generation and the Democratic Generation. Therefore, the generational characteristics 
towards USFK, which were identified in Chapter II, are confirmed by these two poll 
questions from the Asan Institute. 
3. Perception of Defense Burden Sharing 
The third opinion poll highlights one of the most conflictual and sensitive topics in 
the U.S.-ROK alliance. Defense Burden Sharing is a multi-faceted issue to South Koreans 
that it impacts domestic politics, national security, diplomatic relations, and economy. Thus, 
the result might not exactly follow the generational characteristic of the national security 
issue and the generational perception of the United States. The exact verbiage of the poll 
question asked is: How should ROK negotiate the next year’s defense burden sharing with 
the United States? The poll results are shown in Table 17. 
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Table 17. South Korean Perception of USFK and Defense Cost Sharing 
(August 2019)202  












Total 500 49.9% 25.2% 11.5% 13.4% 
Region Seoul 105 46.4% 16.8% 18.1% 18.6% 
Gyeong-gi 166 60.3% 21.0% 8.9% 9.9% 
Gangwon 16 27.1% 29.6% 32.5% 10.8% 
Chung-cheong 41 36.8% 34.6% 10.5% 18.1% 
Jeolla 47 51.3% 28.1% 5.1% 15.4% 
Gyeong-buk 43 42.2% 33.3% 6.9% 17.6% 
Gyeong-nam 78 51.6% 30.2% 9.9% 8.3% 
Jeju 4 43.3% 17.3% 39.3% 0.0% 
Generation New 152 49.5% 21.4% 13.8% 15.3% 
Democratic 99 51.3% 22.8% 11.4% 14.4% 
Transition 113 50.7% 28.7% 11.1% 9.6% 
War 136 49.3% 30.2% 8.2% 12.3% 
Political 
Identity 
Conservative 95 43.8% 23.1% 18.7% 14.5% 
Center-middle 188 52.7% 23.8% 14.3% 9.2% 
Progressive 145 58.2% 24.5% 6.7% 10.6% 
Note 1: Table reconstructed from Realmeter data, the original data shows age-group as decades 
(30s, 40s, etc). 
 
The poll was conducted on August 9, 2019, as the New Secretary of Defense, Mark 
Esper, visited Korea for the first time to discuss various alliance issues including the SMA. 
Also a couple of days prior, President Trump tweeted that the defense burden sharing 
negotiation has begun, and South Korea has agreed to pay “substantially more.”203 Since 
1991, the ROK government contributed a portion of the cost required to stationing the U.S. 
 




203 Haye-ah Lee, “U.S. says Trump has been clear on wanting allies to contribute more to defense,” 
Yonhap News, August 9, 2019, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190809000351325.  
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military in Korea. The South Korean burden share gradually increased to 1 trillion Korean 
Won (approximately US$ 915 million).204 However, Washington consistently pressured 
Seoul to increase the defense burden share five-folds, which drove the 11th SMA 
negotiation into the stalemate.  
In this uneasy environment, the poll result shows that about half of South Korean 
people from all generations want to freeze the burden share at the current amount. The poll 
result also shows that the younger the people get, there is a higher amount of respondents 
who wants to raise the shared cost to maintain the U.S.-ROK alliance. Regionally, people 
from Seoul are more willing to raise the cost, and people from Chung-cheong province 
show more interest in lowering the cost from the current level. Statistics from Gangwon 
and Jeju province are not used since the sample size does not provide statistical relevancy. 
Self-identified political identity follows characterized tendencies, that the conservatives 
are more willing to raise the cost to maintain the alliance whereas the progressives are more 
interested in lowering the cost even the U.S.-ROK alliance relationship goes in jeopardy. 
4. Perception of Favorability of U.S. Presidents 
The last opinion poll is about the South Korean perception of U.S. presidents. The 
role and responsibility of the U.S. President are critical to the U.S.-ROK alliance, 
especially when the U.S. President has an executive power to mobilize the military under 
its authority.205 This thesis compares two polls on the two most recent U.S. presidents 
(President Obama and President Trump) to capture an accurate picture of South Korean 
generational perception of the position, rather than on the person who is serving in that role. 
The first poll was taken in March 2018, under the term of President Trump, and the second 
poll was taken in September 2013, during the second term of President Obama. The 
question that both polls asked was: what is your perception of the current U.S. President? 
The opinion poll results are shown in Table 18. 
 
204 Haye-ah Lee, “U.S. says Trump has been clear on wanting allies to contribute more to defense,” 
Yonhap News, August 9, 2019, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190809000351325. 
205 “War Powers,” Library of Congress, October 15, 2019, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/
war-powers.php.  
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Table 18. South Korean Perception of U.S. Presidents (September 2013/
March 2018)206 
  Trump (March 2018) Obama (September 2013) 













Total 1003 24.0% 67.0% 9.0% 1207 71.0% 16.0% 13.0% 
Region Seoul 199 28.0% 65.0% 7.0% - - - - 
Gyeong-gi 298 22.0% 68.0% 11.0% - - - - 
Gangwon 29 - - - - - - - 
Chung-cheong 106 23.0% 68.0% 9.0% - - - - 
Jeolla 102 19.0% 72.0% 9.0% - - - - 
Gyeong-buk 106 21.0% 69.0% 10.0% - - - - 
Gyeong-nam 151 26.0% 65.0% 9.0% - - - - 
Jeju 12 - - - - - - - 
Generation New 328 19.4% 71.3% 9.3% 459 73.6% 15.4% 11.1% 
  Democratic 216 17.0% 78.0% 5.0% 263 63.0% 22.0% 15.0% 
  Transition 208 23.0% 68.0% 10.0% 234 73.0% 10.0% 17.0% 
  War 251 35.0% 53.0% 12.0% 253 75.0% 7.0% 18.0% 
Political 
Identity 
Conservative 252 35.0% 59.0% 6.0% - - - - 
Center-middle 249 18.0% 72.0% 11.0% - - - - 
Progressive 376 19.0% 74.0% 6.0% - - - - 
Note 1: Table reconstructed from Gallup Korea data, the original data shows age-group as 
decades (30s, 40s, etc.).  
Note 2: The original data has not given statistics for sample size smaller than 50. 
Note 3: The original September 2013 poll data only provides the statistics for age-groups. 
 
There is a big favorability rate difference between President Obama (overall 71% 
favorable) and President Trump (overall 24% favorable). The discrepancy between these 
two poll results seems very wide, but the trend line shows similar shapes as shown in Figure 
13. This confirms that regardless of who sits in the position, South Korean generations hold 
particular perceptions on the top U.S. political leader based on the cohort characteristics. 
 
206 Adapted from Gallup Korea, “Gallup Report (20131007),” October 2013, 
https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=477; Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion 
(20180316),” March 2018, https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=911. 
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Figure 13. South Korean Opinion Poll Results on Favorability of U.S. 
Presidents, Reproduced from September 2013 and March 2018 Data207 
The results follow the South Korean generational tendencies on the United States 
and the U.S.-ROK alliance, that are identified in Chapter II. The New and War generations, 
who are in the current age-group of 20s and 30s, and 60s and older, show a more favorable 
perception than the Democratic and Transition/386 generations, who are in the current age-
group of 40s and 50s. This trend is consistent in both poll results, regardless of who is in 
the president’s seat, as depicted in Figure 13.  
5. Trend Analysis on Generational Perspectives—U.S.-ROK Alliance 
Issues 
There are some common features that we confirmed from the opinion poll analysis 
over the South Korean generational perception of the U.S.-ROK alliance-related issues. 
First, all three public opinion poll graphs, except the poll on the defense burden share, 
depict a very similar pattern of a trend line. According to the shape of trend lines shown in 
Figure 14, the trend resembles those of North Korean issues—a U or V shape.  
 




Figure 14. Generational Perspective on All Four U.S.-related Issues208 
This shape represents that the New and War generations have more positive 
perceptions of relying on the United States for the security of South Korea. These two 
conservative generations trust the U.S. forces in Korea and support its presence in the 
Korean peninsula, as well as the U.S. leadership. However, the Democratic and Transition/
386 generations, who are in their 40s and 50s, show more negative perceptions of the U.S.-
ROK alliance compared to the New and War generations. The Democratic Generation, the 
most progressive generation in Korean society, seems to have the most anti-American 
sentiment as well. This could be the result of the anti-American sentiment that emerged 
after the Cold War. However, the cohort experience analysis suggests that this generation 
has a strong will to enhance the Korean national autonomy, and they see the U.S.-ROK 
alliance as an outdated Cold-War legacy, an obstacle that hinders ROK to achieve the full 
autonomy and self-defense. 
 
208 Adapted from James Kim, Choong-gu Kang, Yumi Ko, Scott Snyder, and Ellen Swicord, “South 
Korean Perception of the US–ROK alliance and USFK;” Realmeter, “ROK’s USFK Cost Sharing for the 
Next Year;” Gallup Korea, “Gallup Report (20131007);” Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20180316).” 
107 
As a separate issue, the defense burden sharing shows an unexpected outcome trend, 
which is different from the other three poll results. It shows a more linear line, representing 
that the New Generation is more willing to pay more cost as a defense burden share. This 
can be explained in a combination of its nationalistic idea of strong Korea and the sense of 
frustration caused by the increased regional instability. Also, the cohort experience analysis 
suggests that the War Generation should have a strong reliance on the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
However, the poll result shows that, as South Korean people get older, they are less 
supportive of the idea of increasing the cost. Rather, they want to lower the cost. Potentially, 
this discrepancy can be explained with the older generation’s experience of a gradual 
increase in the defense sharing cost. Until 1991, there was no ROK contribution to U.S. 
forces stationed in Korea—other than the free lease of land and facilities under SOFA.209 
However, through the 1st SMA of 1991, ROK started to contribute to the stationing cost of 
USFK. The contribution cost increased from US$150 million to US$915 million in nearly 
30 years.210 The older generation who used to pay nothing for the USFK stationing cost 
could feel burdensome and uncomfortable to pay US$1 billion (and President Trump 
request to raise the amount five-fold), which is not small money compared to 
approximately US$40 billion total defense budget.211 In sum, based on the trend analysis 
of the opinion polls related to the U.S.-ROK alliance, the New Generation, who is in 20s 
and 30s, is more willing to establish symmetric alliance while strengthening the alliance, 
whereas the  Democratic Generation wants to move away from the alliance to enhance 
autonomy and neutrality of South Korea in the regional and global conflicts. The 
Transition/386 Generation strongly believe in the U.S.-ROK alliance despite its anti-
American generational characteristics, and the War Generation, who directly witnessed the 
“blood-tied” alliance, is the stronghold of the U.S.-ROK alliance—while the older people 
think it is not fair to pay contribution for the USFK stationing in South Korea. Yet, overall, 
 
209 Ministry of National Defense, 2016 Defense White Paper (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 
2016), 152. 
210 Ministry of National Defense, 2018 Defense White Paper (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 
2018), 178–79. 
211 Yonhap, “S. Korea’s 2020 defense budget rises 7.4% to over 50tr won,” The Korea Herald, 
December 11, 2019, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20191211000099.  
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the majority of South Koreans, regardless of generations, still strongly believe that the 
U.S.-ROK alliance is both necessary and effective for ensuring the ROK national security. 
C. GENERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON SOUTH KOREAN AUTONOMY/
SELF-DEFENSE 
From the ashes of the war, South Korea has transformed into one of the most 
developed nations in the world. Through this rapid transition in its national status, each 
generation in South Korea started to form different perceptions of its nation and different 
types of nationalism—these are discussed in detail in Chapter II. These different 
generational perceptions led to different perceptions of national autonomy. One group 
could think that ROK still needs a security guarantor for its survival, and tight alignment 
with a great power nation is necessary since South Korea is a small country. From the 
opposite end, another group could think that ROK is strong enough to protect itself, and 
South Korea should expand its autonomy on diplomacy, foreign policies, and inter-Korean 
relationship—away from the influence of other nations. Traditionally, as an allied nation 
under the U.S. sphere of influence, South Korea aligned with the U.S. interest and 
supported the U.S. decisions. However, recently there are some issues that challenge this 
relationship as ROK national interest does not necessarily align with the U.S. interest in 
those issues. This thesis will assess public opinion polls on these issues and check whether 
each generation follows its cohort characteristics and tendencies. 
The expected generational tendencies can be drawn from the cohort-experience 
analysis in Chapter II. Unlike generational perceptions on North Korea and the U.S.-ROK 
alliance, generational perceptions on autonomy are more complicated and multifaceted, so 
each issue will be assessed separately without generalization of generational characteristics. 
However, one common theme that can be seen from the result is that generational 
tendencies on national autonomy depend on each generation’s different ideas on 
nationalism and its subjective regional threat assessment surrounding the Korean peninsula.  
1. Perception of ROK–Japan Military Cooperation—GSOMIA 
The first opinion poll was selected to see how each South Korean generation 
perceives differently on the issue of General Security of Military Information Agreement 
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(GSOMIA)—a military intelligence share agreement between ROK and Japan. GSOMIA 
symbolizes the trilateral alliance among the United States, Japan, and South Korea against 
the North Korean threat and potentially rising China. However, the diplomatic dispute 
between ROK and Japan has led the South Korean government’s decision to terminate 
GSOMIA. Although the ROK government eventually repealed its decision and continued 
this military agreement with Japan, it revealed the current ROK administration’s 
assessment on regional security, and its willingness to abandon the trilateral alliance if 
needed. The opinion poll was taken amidst the ROK government’s decision to terminate 
GSOMIA. The poll question asked was: Do you agree with the government’s decision to 
terminate GSOMIA? The opinion poll result is shown in Table 19. 
Table 19. South Korean Perception of Terminating GSOMIA (August 
2019)212  
    
Sample Size Agree (Terminate) 
Disagree 
(Extend) No answer 
Total 1004 53% 28% 19% 
Region Seoul 193 51% 37% 13% 
Gyeong-gi 307 55% 26% 19% 
Gangwon 33 - - - 
Chung-cheong 104 52% 28% 19% 
Jeolla 102 65% 11% 24% 
Gyeong-buk 100 43% 34% 24% 
Gyeong-nam 150 55% 27% 17% 
Jeju 15 - - - 
Generation New 318 60% 22% 19% 
Democratic 191 68% 21% 11% 
Transition 215 52% 35% 13% 
War 280 34% 36% 29% 
Political Identity Conservative 252 35% 52% 13% 
Center-middle 293 56% 30% 14% 
Progressive 280 80% 9% 10% 
Note 1: Table reconstructed from Gallup Korea data, the original data shows age-group as 
decades (30s, 40s, etc).  
Note 2: The original data has not given statistics for sample size smaller than 50. 
 
212 Adapted from Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20190830),” August 2019, 
https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1042.  
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The results show that there is a significant left-right politic over the GSOMIA issue. 
Self-identified political identity suggests that the progressives are more supportive of the 
government’s decision to terminate GSOMIA (80% supporting government’s decision), 
whereas the conservatives are more inclined to continue the GSOMIA (35% supporting 
government’s decision). The regional tendencies also suggest that this issue has a 
significant left-right politics (e.g., division between Jeolla and Gyeong-buk provinces). 
However, generationally, the explanation of this issue is more complicated. First, it does 
not follow South Korean generational perception of Japan nor the generational 
participating rate of boycotting Japanese products. For example, as shown in Figures 15, 
the majority of the New Generation wants to terminate the GSOMIA, but people from the 
New Generation have more favorable feelings towards Japanese, and they have the largest 




Figure 15. Comparison of South Korean Public Poll Results on Japan-related 
Issues213 
Thus, the issue of GSOMIA is more than just another sample depiction of anti-
Japanese nationalism in Korean generations, but a combination of nationalism and 
generational perception of their self-help national security. Based on the poll results, one 
can say the younger generations believe that North Korea is not as a big threat to South 
Korea, and South Korea is strong enough to not rely on GSOMIA and trilateral alliance for 
its defense. However, the older generations, especially the War Generation, could believe 
that North Korea continues to carry a serious threat to South Korea, and South Korea is not 
strong enough to ensure its own security and needs to strengthen the trilateral alliance to 
fight against the common threat. Therefore, the generational tendencies shown in this issue 
 
213 213 Adapted from Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20190830);” Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion 
(20190712).” 
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do not deviate from the cohort characteristics on autonomy analyzed in Chapter II, but it 
requires a comprehensive approach to explain the generational tendencies. 
2. Perception of Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) Transfer  
The second poll is about wartime Operational Control (OPCON) transfer. OPCON 
is regarded as a key issue that is directly related to South Korean autonomy, as it refers to 
South Korea’s authority to command its own military forces during contingencies. At the 
break of the Korean War, the ROK government gave the UN Forces commander the 
authority to control the ROK military to effectively conduct the war effort. Since then, 
USFK Commander had this authority until the ROK-US Combined Forces Command 
resumed the authority in 1978.214 The peacetime OPCON was transferred to the ROK 
government in 1994, with the promise to transfer the wartime OPCON in the near future. 
However, the North Korean nuclear threat erupted suddenly, and wartime OPCON 
transition was delayed until the ROK military is fully capable of ensuring its defense.215 
South Korean public believes that OPCON transfer has a symbolic meaning of 
autonomy. 216  Thus, this opinion poll gives a good assessment of South Korean 
generational perception of its national autonomy. The poll question asked was: What do 
you think about the government’s decision to postpone the OPCON transfer? Unfortunately, 
there was no poll data found that was conducted more recently. This can impact the 
integrity of the age-group analysis by shifting each generational year-group by five-or-so 
years. With this condition, this thesis is using another newer poll results to augment the 
data for the accurate representation of generational tendencies. The opinion poll result is 
shown in Table 20. 
  
 
214 Clint Work, “The Long History of South Korea’s OPCON Debate,” The Diplomat, November 01, 
2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/the-long-history-of-south-koreas-opcon-debate/.  
215 Clint Work, “South Korea: Dependence in the Age of OPCON,” The Diplomat, July 09, 2014, 
https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/south-korea-dependence-in-the-age-of-opcon/.  
216 Clint Work, “The Long History of South Korea’s OPCON Debate,” The Diplomat, November 01, 
2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/the-long-history-of-south-koreas-opcon-debate/. 
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Table 20. South Korean Perception of Delaying the OPCON Transfer 
(October 2014)217  
    Sample Size Delay As Planned 
No 
answer 
Total 1023 51.0% 32.0% 18.0% 
Region Seoul 233 67.0% 18.0% 3.0% 
Gyeong-gi 299 61.0% 19.0% 7.0% 
Gangwon 23 - - - 
Chung-cheong 94 51.0% 24.0% 12.0% 
Jeolla 108 65.0% 17.0% 1.0% 
Gyeong-buk 98 67.0% 18.0% 6.0% 
Gyeong-nam 157 64.0% 18.0% 4.0% 
Jeju 11 - - - 
Generation New 352 42.0% 41.0% 18.0% 
Democratic 200 49.0% 37.0% 14.0% 
Transition 235 59.0% 25.0% 16.0% 
War 236 61.0% 17.0% 22.0% 
Political Identity Conservative - - - - 
Center-middle - - - - 
Progressive - - - - 
Note 1: Table reconstructed from Gallup Korea data, the original data shows age-group as 
decades (30s, 40s, etc).  
Note 2: The original data has not given statistics for sample size smaller than 50. 
Note 3: The original data has not given statistics for self-identified political identities. 
 
The results follow the expected generational tendencies. The older generation is 
more supportive of the government’s decision to delay the OPCON transition, whereas the 
younger the people get, people get more disapproving of the government’s decision. 
According to the more recent data in 2019 by Asan Institute, South Koreans are still widely 
divided on OPCON transfer (Figure 16).  
 




Figure 16. South Korean Public Poll Results on OPCON Transfer Issues, 
Reproduced from the Asan Institute Data218 
 
 
Figure 17. In-depth Assessment of Public Poll Responses, Reproduced from 
the Asan Institute Data219 
 
218 Adapted from James Kim, Choong-gu Kang, Yumi Ko, Scott Snyder, and Ellen Swicord, “South 
Korean Perception of the US–ROK alliance and USFK.” 
219 Adpated from James Kim, Choong-gu Kang, Yumi Ko, Scott Snyder, and Ellen Swicord, “South 





What should South Korea do for the wartime 







Although Asan Institute does not provide the generational details on its poll results, 
it gives a deeper assessment of why people responded in that way. As shown in Figure 17, 
South Koreans expressed their reasons for their response to the poll. Among the people 
who answered the OPCON transfer is necessary, 80.7% of respondents said it is necessary 
because OPCON is related to ROK’s autonomy (combining response rates of “It is related 
to ROK’s sovereignty,” “To reduce reliance to the U.S. alliance,” and “To prepare for the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces”). Also, among the people who answered the OPCON should be 
delayed or canceled, 35.2% of respondents said OPCON should not be transitioned because 
it could harm the existing U.S.-ROK alliance (combining response rates of “To maintain 
the alliance at the current level,” and “To deter the withdrawal of USFK”). 
3. Perception of the Conflict Between the United States and China 
The third opinion poll is about South Korean perception of emerging great power 
competition between the United States and China. If ever South Korean is asked to choose 
a side between two great power nations, what would ROK’s decision be? The United States 
is “blood-tied ally,” who defend and protect South Korea since the Korean War. China, on 
the other hand, is a traditional hegemon in the region for thousands of years. Currently, as 
a global economic powerhouse, China consists of more than one-quarter of South Korean 
gross national trade. To ROK, both the United States and China are an important global 
partner that has a symbiotic relationship with South Korea. Therefore, the public poll can 
provide a good gauge on which country the South Korean public values more. The poll 
question asked was: What should ROK do when the conflict between the United States and 
China gets worse? The opinion poll result is shown in Table 21. 
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Table 21. South Korean Perception of the Conflict Between the United States 
and China (July 2018)220  
    





Total 1200 39.2% 7.6% 53.2% 
Region GSMA 601 44.6% 7.5% 47.9% 
Gangwon 35 30.6% 2.3% 67.1% 
Chung-cheong 128 32.5% 3.9% 63.7% 
Jeolla 116 38.7% 8.2% 53.2% 
Gyeong-sang 306 33.8% 10.0% 56.1% 
Jeju 14 16.2% 3.0% 80.8% 
Generation New 448 37.2% 6.3% 56.5% 
Democratic 259 41.3% 8.5% 50.2% 
Transition 260 42.2% 4.6% 53.2% 
War 233 37.4% 12.6% 50.0% 
Political Identity Conservative 212 44.4% 9.0% 46.6% 
Center-middle 577 38.7% 6.2% 55.1% 
Progressive 411 37.3% 8.9% 53.8% 
Note 1: Table reconstructed from 2018 Unification Perception Survey data, the original data 
shows age-group as decades (30s, 40s, etc).  
Note 2: Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (GSMA) includes Seoul, Incheon, Gyeong-gi province. 
 
Based on South Korean left-right political characteristics, conservatives are 
expected to value more on the traditional relationship with the United States, and 
progressives are expected to remain neutral between two powerful nations to maximize the 
national interest. The self-identified conservatives and progressives do follow these 
expected tendencies. However, the South Korean regional differences do not show a strong 
characteristic of this issue based on the result shown in Table 21. Jeolla province is 
expected to show more anti-American tendencies while the Gyeong-sang province shows 
more pro-American tendencies. These expected tendencies are not shown in the result.  
 
220 Adapted from Dong-jun Chung, Sun Kim, Hee-jung Kim, Yong-woo Na, In-cheol Moon, Young-
hun Song, Gyu-bin Choi, Kyung-hun Im, and Jung-wook Lee, 2018 Unification Perception Survey (Seoul: 
Seoul National University Press, 2019), 365, http://tongil.snu.ac.kr/xe/sub710.  
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Similarly, the generational results do not show these expected left-right political 
characteristics. The New Generation, despite it has a conservative tendency, could show 
more desire for self-help autonomy since it is also part of its generational tendency. 
However, the result of the War Generation is hard to understand with simple left-right 
political tendencies. The War Generation has lower support of the United States than the 
Transition/386 and Democratic generations, and the highest support of China among all 
four generations. This offbeat result could potentially be explained with the War 
Generation’s experience of industrialization. Since March 2018, the Trump administration 
began the Trade War with China. Many South Koreans thought that the trade war was 
inevitable due to systematic differences between the two nations. However, as a generation 
who experienced the state-led industrialization (which is somewhat similar to China’s 
developmental policy), the War Generation could think this U.S. attack on China as the 
tyranny of the United States.  
4. Perception of South Korean Nuclear Weapons Programs 
The last opinion poll is about South Korean perception of arming itself with nuclear 
weapons. To make a stronger case with data crosscheck, the poll data was taken from two 
sources. Both polls were conducted in September 2017, with the same question asked by 
two different polling agencies: Should ROK arm itself with the nuclear weapon? The 
results are shown in Table 22, and results from two sources are following similar patterns—
which confirms the accurate representation of the South Korean perception at that time. 
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Table 22. South Korean Perception of Arming with Indigenous Nuclear 
Weapons (September 2017)221 
  
Gallup (September 2017) Realmeter (September 2017) 
    
Sample 




Size Agree Disagree 
No 
answer 
Total 1004 60.0% 35.0% 4.0% 506 53.5% 35.1% 11.4% 
Region Seoul 207 50.0% 44.0% 6.0% 138 49.1% 41.0% 9.9% 
Gyeong-gi 306 58.0% 38.0% 4.0% 147 55.4% 36.0% 8.6% 
Gangwon 28 - - - 22 39.8% 29.6% 30.7% 
Chung-cheong 107 64.0% 34.0% 2.0% 41 59.8% 29.1% 11.0% 
Jeolla 102 63.0% 30.0% 7.0% 53 42.7% 47.0% 10.3% 
Gyeong-buk 85 67.0% 28.0% 4.0% 32 74.6% 10.8% 14.6% 
Gyeong-nam 148 64.0% 34.0% 2.0% 64 48.6% 38.2% 13.2% 
Jeju 11 - - - 9 40.8% 40.3% 18.9% 
Generation New 354 41.3% 53.7% 5.0% 152 45.2% 43.2% 11.6% 
Democratic 198 52.0% 42.0% 5.0% 111 40.2% 55.4% 4.4% 
Transition 199 74.0% 23.0% 3.0% 124 62.0% 31.0% 7.0% 
War 253 83.0% 14.0% 3.0% 119 71.6% 8.7% 19.7% 
Political 
Identity 
Conservative 247 74.0% 21.0% 4.0% 116 81.4% 15.9% 2.6% 
Center-middle 279 58.0% 38.0% 4.0% 195 49.3% 37.8% 13.0% 
Progressive 353 47.0% 48.0% 4.0% 142 37.9% 54.3% 7.8% 
Note 1: Table reconstructed from Gallup Korea data, the original data shows age-group as 
decades (30s, 40s, etc).  
Note 2: The original Gallup Korea data has not given statistics for sample size smaller than 50. 
 
In modern history, a nuclear weapon has a special meaning to one’s national 
defense. Nuclear capability almost guarantees a deterrence of hostile aggression by 
enemies. Also, to deter a state with nuclear capability, one also needs to possess a nuclear 
 
221 Adapted from Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20170908),” September 2017, 
https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=860; Realmeter, “Public Perception of South 









capability to balance the asymmetrical power. Historically, the United States provided 
nuclear deterrence for South Korea. However, since the 1990s, North Korea started to 
develop its nuclear weapon, and it successfully tested a high yield bomb in September 2017. 
Now South Korea has two options to balance against the North Korean nuclear threat. One 
is relying on the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States, and another is developing 
its own. Therefore, these South Koreans public opinion polls taken in September 2017 
provide a good gauge on South Korean perception of owning a nuclear weapon as a self-
defense, and how each political/generational group forms its perception toward this issue. 
Based on the poll results, the self-identified conservatives strongly desire to possess 
nuclear weapons. The progressives still show a relatively high approval rate to possess a 
nuclear weapon, but it is about half of what the conservatives have shown (74-81% 
conservatives vs. 37–47% progressives). Regionally, the Realmeter data show an expected 
left-right division among the provinces, but the Gallup Korea data does not show these 
tendencies. Generationally, as shown in Figure 18, both poll data suggest that the younger 
generations (New and Democratic generations) have less desire to possess nuclear weapons, 
whereas the older generations (Transition/386 and War generations) have a stronger desire 
for indigenous nuclear capability.  
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Figure 18. Comparison of South Korean Public Poll Results on Nuclear 
Weapons Self-Arming Issues222 
This result does not correlate with the expected generational tendencies since the 
younger generations are expected to show more eagerness towards the self-help autonomy 
and national defense by acquiring the nuclear weapon than the older generations. The 
unexpected outcome could be explained with the liberal institutional value which was 
taught after the Cold War is over (both Democratic and New Generations received public 
education under the post-Cold War values). According to these new values, based on new 
orders under the United States, a nuclear weapon is against international law (UN NPT), 
and it is a source of destruction rather than the security guarantor. Thus, the younger 
generation could believe that possessing a nuclear weapon is not a viable option, but rather 
they want to make nuclear-free Korea. 
5. Trend Analysis on Generational Perspectives—Autonomy Issues 
The poll results on the South Korean autonomy and self-help national defense 
issues show a consistent trend that can be seen in Figure 19. All four poll results have a 
linear-shape trend line, which suggests that the generational difference is rooted in the 
aging effect. The younger they are, people have more strong tendency towards autonomy 
and national sovereignty, and as people get older, they start to seek more stability and 
 
222 Adapted from Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20170908);” Realmeter, “Public Perception of South 
Korean Nuclear Weapons Development and Deployment.”  
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assurance through relying on the U.S. alliance. Also, the trend line suggests that left-right 
political tendencies are not the most deterministic in the autonomy issues, since generations 
do not seem to follow its conservatism or progressivism in these four issues, but rather 
following the simple aging effect. For example, the New Generation and War Generation 
are the conservative generations in South Korean society. However, on the GSOMIA issue, 
the War Generation is more willing to extend GSOMIA with Japan even with its anti-
Japanese sentiments, and the New Generation, despite its relatively good perceptions 
towards Japan, wanted to terminate the GSOMIA. Also, on the issue of the United States–
China conflict, the generations with anti-American tendencies (the Democratic and 
Transition/386) showed higher support rate for the United States, while the New 
Generation, who values the U.S.-ROK alliance against the North Korean threat, showed 
the highest support for neutrality among all South Korean generations. Thus, this thesis 
suggests that the issues regarding national autonomy are a significant factor that 
differentiates the generation in South Korea.  
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Figure 19. Generational Perspective on Autonomy-Related Issues223 
However, on the issue of possessing nuclear weapons, the trend suddenly reverses. 
The older people are more eager to possess indigenous nuclear capability when younger 
people are not enthusiastic about it. This thesis suggests that there could be a stronger 
generational tendency, such as the liberal institutional values, that overwhelms the 
generational tendencies on autonomy. Yet, the generational tendencies on autonomy can 
be regularly seen on the other three poll data, so the nuclear issue can be an irregularity.  
 
223 Adapted from Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion (20190830);” Gallup Korea, “Daily Opinion 
(20141031);” Dong-jun Chung, Sun Kim, Hee-jung Kim, Yong-woo Na, In-cheol Moon, Young-hun Song, 
Gyu-bin Choi, Kyung-hun Im, and Jung-wook Lee, 2018 Unification Perception Survey; Gallup Korea, 
“Daily Opinion (20170908);” Realmeter, “Public Perception of South Korean Nuclear Weapons 
Development and Deployment.” 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES AND IMPACTS 
This thesis has examined the issue of South Korean generational differences, and 
its implications for the U.S.-ROK alliance. Through assessing the cohort experiences that 
have shaped the generational characteristics and political tendencies, the South Korean 
society has identified into four generations: War, Transition/386, Democratic, and New. 
Each of these generations has shown distinct tendencies on key issues that are directly 
related to South Korean national security, such as issues about North Korea, the United 
States, and national autonomy from the U.S. influence. South Korean generational 
characteristics were tested using public opinion poll data. The test result confirms that there 
are significant generational differences that exist in South Korean society, and each 
generation’s response to national security issues follows respective generational 
characteristics and political tendencies stemmed from the cohort-experience. 
Among numerous cohort events that have formed the generations, there are four 
most critical events that distinguish one age-cohort from another. The first is the experience 
of the Korean War and the reconstruction. These experiences distinguish the oldest 
generation, the War Generation, from the younger generations. The second is the 
experience of the authoritarian regimes. This experience differentiates the older two 
generations, the War Generation and the Transition/386 Generation, from the younger two 
generations. The third experience is the Democratization of 1987. This experience 
distinguishes the Democratic Generation. The fourth experience is the 1997 IMF crisis. 
This experience distinguishes the youngest generation, the New Generation.  
Through these unique historical environments and distinct cohort events, four 
generations have formed specific political tendencies and perceptions that are also closely 
aligned to the left-right political identities in South Korea. Also, these generational 
differences in terms of conservative-progressive politics are clearly identifiable in national 




Table 23. South Korean Generational Perceptions on Three National Security Issues 
  War Transition/386 Democratic New 
Current Age (As of 2020) 61 and Older 51 – 60 40 – 50 20 – 39 
Formative Years Older – 1984 1975 – 1994 1985 – 2005 1996 – 2025 
North Korea Anti Pro Pro Anti 
Rationale - Memories of the Korean War 
- Anti-communism 
- Real existential threat from 
NK 
- Anti-SK authoritarianism 
- Finding alternatives 
- Ethnic nationalism 
- Post-ideological Dichotomy 
- Supremacy over NK 
- Mood of inter-Korean 
reconciliation 
- Increased NK provocations 
- Weaker ethnic nationalism 
- Untrustworthy NK actions 
United States Pro Anti Anti Pro 
Rationale - Memories of the Korean War 
- Cold War alliance (Anti-
communism) 
- U.S. being the benefactor 
- U.S. supporting SK 
authoritarian regimes 
- Anti-Sadae 
- Ethnic nationalism (U.S. 
being the intruders) 
- Against ideological 
dichotomy 
- Desire for more autonomy 
- Obstacle for inter-Korean 
reconciliation 
- Security/stability guarantor 
- Practical Nationalism 
Autonomy Anti Pro->Anti Pro Pro 
Rationale - Patron-Client relationship 
- Priorities in stability 
- Ethnic sovereignty 
- Anti-Sadae 
- Confidence from Strong 
Korea 
- Maturing Democracy 
- Hatred towards unfairness 
- Practical Nationalism 
- Globalization 
- Hatred towards unfairness 
 Note 1: For a more detailed analysis of generational characteristics, refer to Table 7. 
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The generational differences are largely formed by the cohort effect. This can be 
seen by consistent generational tendencies on different security issues. For example, the 
Democratic Generation showed a more favorable attitude towards North Korea and a more 
negative attitude towards the United States in all assessed poll results despite the political 
atmosphere and threat assessment at the time of the poll. However, the New Generation, 
unlike the Democratic Generation, showed a negative attitude towards North Korea and a 
favorable attitude towards the United States in all of the same poll data.  
There were some poll cases that have shown the aging effect from the older 
generations, especially from the more progressive-minded Transition/386 Generation. For 
example, the Transition/386 Generation expressed more conservative tendencies on the 
issues of autonomy, which is opposing the analyzed generational characteristics based on 
cohort experience. Thus, this thesis concludes that South Korean generations show a very 
strong cohort effect in their tendencies on national security issues, with some noticeable 
aging effect (conservatization) on the Transition/386 Generation.  
Furthermore, this thesis concludes that the New Generation, a youngest South 
Korean generation who started to show more weight in South Korean politics, possesses 
more practical and rational perspectives towards its nation’s security. This is a different 
attribute from the previous generations, which signifies weakened ideological and 
historical influences over this young political generation living in 21st century Korea. 
Instead of reacting emotionally, people from the New Generation try to think rationally, 
calculating what is more beneficial and hold more value to them. Their calculation is not 
only based on monetary/materialistic values but also on their identity and conscience. 
Strong strive for a fair and equal society is one exposed outcome of this rational tendency.  
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B. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. 
POLICYMAKERS 
The alliance between the United States and the ROK is often referred to as an 
“Alliance Forged in Blood.”224  Throughout the 67-years of its history, there were many 
incidents and disputes that jeopardized this blood-tied relationship, but the alliance endured, 
and it remains as a critical component for South Korea’s politics and security. This 
endurance can be explained through different international relations (IR) theories. For 
example, the realists would argue that the alliance endured because of the persisted 
common security threat—North Korea, and maintaining the alliance is better serving both 
national interests of the United States and South Korea. The institutionalists would argue 
that the alliance endured because of the path dependency of the robust institutions (i.e., 
norms, rules, procedures), that became much cost-effective to maintain the alliance rather 
than terminate and creating a new one.225 Either case, the U.S.-ROK alliance is firm, and 
the relationship between the two nations is stronger than what some people concern. This 
is well represented by the poll data as well. Despite the anti-American sentiments and urge 
for the national autonomy from the U.S. influence, the majority of South Koreans across 
all generations and regions support the alliance (see Table 15 and Table 16).  
The issues that were discussed in this thesis are the issues that are ongoing in current 
South Korean politics. Further assessing public perceptions on these sets of issues would 
have real implications. In January 2020, South Korea decided to send ROK Navy as part 
of peacekeeping military deployment at Strait of Hormuz. Since the mid-2019, the United 
States has pressed ROK to participate in the International Maritime Security Construct 
(IMSC) as a U.S.-ally against Iran.226 However, South Korea did not want to deteriorate 
the long-standing economic relationship with Iran, so it decided a compromised approach 
 
224 William Stueck and Boram Yi, “‘An Alliance Forged in Blood’: The American Occupation of 
Korea, the Korean War, and the US–South Korean Alliance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 2 (April 
1, 2010), 177–209. 
225 Celeste Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” 
International Organization 54, no. 4 (Autumn, 2000), 705–06. 
226 Hyun-duk Bang, “Kang Kyung-wha: Our Position Cannot Necessarily be the Same as the U.S. 
Position,” Yonhap News, January 09, 2020, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20200109076500001.  
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by sending its Navy as an “anti-piracy campaign.”227 While this issue of naval deployment 
was being discussed in South Korean congress, ROK Foreign Minister, Kang Kyung-wha 
stated, “I think the U.S. position and [South Korean] position cannot necessarily be the 
same, given the analysis of the situation and the bilateral relationship with the Middle East 
country.”228 Her statement well summarizes the ongoing South Korean issue on national 
autonomy from the U.S. influence and its potential impact toward the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
Also, the Korean ethnic-nationalism revived unresolved historical resentment 
towards Japan. As the relational gap between ROK and the Japanese government deepened 
over the matter of GSOMIA and historical disputes, the ethnic background and mustache 
of Ambassador Harry Harris, the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, became a major issue. 
In December 2019, The Korea Times reported that the South Korean public found his 
mustache, combined with his Japanese-American ethnic background, as a disrespectful 
insult—that it reminded South Korea’s colonial history under the Japanese Governors-
General, which all eight of them had a mustache. 229  This public outrage shows the 
persisting ethnic nationalism in South Korea that stemmed from the anti-Japanese and anti-
Imperial sentiments. As such, generational characteristics based on the cohort effect 
provide relevant explanations on the position of the South Korean public and policymakers.  
South Korea has sprinted to achieve its development for 60-years. Along with this 
full-rate development, the situation and environment surrounding South Korea and 
regional security have vastly had changed. To ensure a strong alliance, proper U.S. 
approaches and actions are required. First, the United States should reemphasize the 
necessity of an alliance system and alignments with its citizens. In the era of new great 
power competition, one of the most potent strengths that the United States possesses over 
other nations is its long-time allies. According to institutionalists, it is cheaper to maintain 
 
227 Sang-mi Cha, “South Korea to deploy anti-piracy unit to the Strait of Hormuz,” Reuters, January 
20, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-mideast/south-korea-to-deploy-anti-piracy-unit-to-
the-strait-of-hormuz-idUSKBN1ZK06H.  
228 Hyun-duk Bang, “Kang Kyung-wha: Our Position Cannot Necessarily be the Same as the U.S. 
Position,” 
229 Whan-woo Yi, “Politics of U.S. envoy’s moustache,” The Korea Times, December 29, 2019, 
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/12/176_281044.html.  
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an alliance than creating a new one.230 Thus, consistent reinforcing of good relations with 
allies is critical to winning over other challenging powers.  
To further strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance, the U.S. policymakers should provide 
a rational and practical proposal, emphasizing the benefits and advantages (and/or 
consequences and disadvantages) of South Korea for maintaining the alliance and 
following the U.S. leadership in the era of great power competition. More specifically, the 
U.S. operation should focus more on media coverage and public information share 
targeting the New Generation in South Korea, emphasizing its nation’s increased role in 
the global stage as a liberal-democratic nation and its associated responsibility. The young 
South Korean generation is willing to take more responsibility in this increased role when 
it gets that level of treatment and reception from the world partners—especially from the 
United States.  
Recently, there is some unpleasant noise coming out from the areas of friction 
between the United States and South Korea, but it is actually a good opportunity to raise a 
strong relationship with South Korea to another level. As a Korean proverb, “the ground 
hardens after the rain,” the U.S.-ROK alliance is going through a rain squall. Once the rain 
passes, the relationship will become more firm. The United States should show generosity 
of sharing its umbrella with South Korea under the heavy rainfall. Squall will soon pass, 
and Sun will shine, and the U.S.-ROK alliance will become stronger. 
 
230 Celeste Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” 705–06. 
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